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ISASI CODE OF ETHICS CANONS
INTEGRITY
Each Member should at all times conduct his
activities in accordance with the high standards of integrity
required of his profession.
PRINCIPLES
Each Member should respect and adhere to
the principles on which ISASI was founded and developed,
as illustrated by the Society’s Bylaws.
OBJECTIVITY
Each Member should lend emphasis to objective deter-
mination of facts during investigations.
LOGIC
Each Member should develop all accident cause-
effect relationships meaningful to air safety based upon
logical application of facts.
ACCIDENT PREVENTION
Each Member should apply facts and analyses
to develop findings and recommendations that will
improve aviation safety.
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What Is ISASI Doing?
By Frank Del Gandio, President
What is ISASI doing for you, our member?
What is ISASI doing for the aviation commu-
nity? What is ISASI doing to improve aircraft
accident investigations and aviation safety?
During the recent annual seminar, ISASI
2003, those questions occurred to me and
were reinforced when I was asked the same
questions by a number of attendees. After some thought, I’d
like to bring you up-to-date on a number of innovations
and improvements.
The Forum, our in-house publication, was completely
revamped and updated 6 years ago from a black-and-white,
stapled collection of articles to a glossy, colored professional
magazine. Today ISASI has a first-class informative and
authoritative journal that is admired throughout the
aviation community.
The growth and popularity of the annual ISASI seminar
have been phenomenal. It seems that each year the seminar
garners progressively higher attendance, and its technical
presentations become more sharply focused to meet the
needs of the air safety investigator to the fast-changing
world of technology. Current technology and recent acci-
dents are always highlighted. I realize that not all members
are able to attend the seminars, and for that reason special
emphasis on seminar presentations and speeches are
featured in the Forum.
The advent of our Reachout seminar program has
become a truly successful innovation. It was established to
provide low-cost, subject-oriented accident investigation
seminars in regions of the world with higher aircraft
accident rates and where the training would have the
greatest impact. The first ISASI Reachout was held in May
2001 in Prague, Czech Republic. Subsequent seminars were
held in India, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Chile, Lebanon, and
Costa Rica. All were unqualified training successes in
attendance and content. Another Reachout seminar was
held in Mexico City in January.
The year 2002 saw the birth of the ISASI Rudy Kapustin
Memorial Scholarship Fund, named for our departed friend
to honor all those ISASI members who have flown west. The
fund is administered by ISASI, and contributions are tax
deductible. Each year two aviation college-level students are
selected through a competitive process and awarded a
grant to attend the annual seminar. Our first scholarship
winners, Noelle Brunelle and Michiel Schuurman, attended
ISASI 2003.
Another innovation is the now easily accessible ISASI
website, www.isasi.org, with a limited public yet extensive
“Members Only” information section. A concerted effort is
currently under way to strengthen the website.
In response to rapidly escalating rental costs and difficul-
ties in obtaining a business-like lease agreement, the ISASI
Executive Council decided to explore purchasing a perma-
nent home. This has proven to be a most forward-thinking
decision. In March 2000, we were able to purchase an
upper-floor condominium office for an excellent price. Not
only did we gain a pleasant and permanent home office, we
have saved more than $15,000 per year in housing costs.
Additionally, by petitioning the county and state govern-
ments, we obtained relief from all personal property and
real estate taxes, for a savings of about $1,200 annually.
In summary, the officers and members of the Interna-
tional Council are actively looking out for the interests of
the Society and expanding its role in the aviation safety
community. Be assured that we will continue to manage
ISASI with you, our member, in mind during our 40th
anniversary year. u
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Budgets Snare Investigator Training
By Ron Schleede, Vice-President
I pass on my sincere
greetings and best
wishes for the New Year.
During several
discussions I have had in
the past couple of years,
particularly during
ISASI 2003, with colleagues from
around the world, it is evident that air
safety investigators, both government
and private sector, are feeling the
worldwide budget crunch being experi-
enced by the aviation industry. Al-
though many government and industry
organizations are cutting budgets that
support investigator training, most
organizations are able to find funds,
even during tight times, to begin and
complete accident investigations.
However, the quality of the investiga-
tion is definitely in question if the in-
vestigators have not maintained profi-
ciency through adequate training. I
have witnessed this problem firsthand
during my career and am also aware
that this problem is prevalent at many
other organizations around the world.
What would happen if we were
investigating an accident involving an
airline that was having financial
difficulties—many currently are—and
we found that pilot, cabin attendant, or
maintenance training had been severely
reduced because of financial distress?
We would probably look long and hard
at this factor in the accident causal
sequence. We might even develop
findings that cite corporate culture and
management deficiencies as being
involved in the accident causal se-
quence. For example, if a pilot involved
in an operational accident had not had
recurrent training, that fact would be a
significant finding. Should air safety
investigators and their managers be
held to lesser standards?
What can ISASI and its members do
to help?
I believe ISASI should form a
working group, ideally with the
assistance of representatives from
organizations with success in maintain-
ing an adequate budget for training its
investigators. Of course, representa-
tives from organizations that would like
to rectify current funding difficulties
should also participate. The working
group could attempt to develop a
logical strategy to aid investigation
V.P.’S CORNER
organizations to resolve this problem.
Based on the comments I have heard
in the past couple of years, I know there
are valid concerns about this matter.
Now we need volunteers to work to
resolve the concerns. If anyone is inter-
ested in assisting, please contact me
directly. I certainly would be available
for counsel and support for such an
effort (ronschleede@aol.com). u
Active members in good standing and
corporate members may acquire, on a no-fee
basis, a copy of the Proceedings of the 34th
International Seminar, held in Washington,
D.C., Aug. 26-28, 2003, by downloading the
information from the appropriate section of
the ISASI web page at http://www.isasi.org.
The seminar papers can be found in the
“Members” section. Further, active members
may purchase the Proceedings on a CD-ROM
for the nominal fee of $15, which covers
postage and handling. Non-ISASI members
may acquire the CD-ROM for a US$75 fee.
A limited number of paper copies of
Proceedings 2003 are available at a cost of
US$150. Checks should accompany the
request and be made payable to ISASI. Mail
to ISASI, 107 E. Holly Ave., Suite 11,
Sterling, VA USA 20164-5405.
The following papers were presented in Washington, D.C.:
• SESSION I Keynote Address Human Spirit and
Accomplishment Are Unlimited by Ellen G. Engleman,
Chairman, NTSB, USA
• The Practical Use of the Root Cause Analysis
System(RCA) Using Reason ®: A Building Block for
Accident/Incident Investigations by Jean-Pierre Dagon,
Director of Corporate Safety, AirTran Airways
• From the Wright Flyer to the Space Shuttle: A
Historical Perspective of Aircraft Accident Investigation
by Jeff Guzzetti, NTSB, USA, and Brian Nicklas, National Air
and Space Museum, USA
• The Emergency and Abnormal Situations Project by
Barbara K. Burian, R. Key Dismukes, and Immanuel Barshi,
NASA Ames Research Center
SESSION II
• Accident Reconstruction—The Decision Process by
John W. Purvis, Safety Services International
• CI611 and GE791 Wreckage Recovery Operations—
Comparisons and Lessons Learned by David Lee, Steven
Su, and Kay Yong, Aviation Safety Council, Taiwan, ROC
• Application of the 3-D Software Wreckage Reconstruc-
tion Technology at the Aircraft Accident Investigation by
Wen-Lin, Guan, Victor Liang, Phil Tai, and Kay Yong, Aviation
Safety Council Taiwan. Presented by Victor Liang.
• CVR Recordings of Explosions and Structural Failure
Decompressions by Stuart Dyne, ISVR Consulting, Institute of
Sound and Vibration Research, University of Southampton, UK
SESSION III Keynote Address Learning for ‘Kicking
Tin’ by Marion C. Blakey, Administrator, FAA, USA
• Investigating Techniques Used for DHC-6 Twin Otter
Accident, March 2001 by Stéphane Corcos and Gérald
Gaubert, BEA, France
• Investigation Enhancement Through Information
Technology by Jay Graser, Galaxy Scientific Corporation
• Historical Review of Flight Attendant Participation in
Accident Investigations by Candace K. Kolander, Association
of Flight Attendants
• Accident Investigation Without the Accident by Michael
R. Poole, Flightscape
SESSION IV Keynote Address Growth of ATC System
and Controllers Union by John Carr, President, National Air
Traffic Controllers Association, USA
• Crashworthiness Investigation: Enhanced Occupant
Protection Through Crashworthiness Evaluation and
Advances in Design—A View form the Wreckage by
William D. Waldock, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
• Enhanced Occupant Protection Through Injury
Pattern Analysis by William T. Gormley, Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner, Commonwealth of Virginia
• Forensic Aspects of Occupant Protection: Victim
Identification by Mary Cimrmancic, Transportation Safety
Institute, Oklahoma City, Okla.
• Aircraft Accident Investigation—The Role of
Aerospace and Preventive Medicine by Allen J. Parmet,
Midwest Occupational Medicine, Kansas City, Mo.
• Expansion of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight
Audit Program to Include Annex 13—Aircraft Accident
and Incident Investigation by Caj Frostell, Chief, Accident
Investigation and Prevention, ICAO
SESSION V
• The CFIT and ALAR Challenge: Attacking the Killers
in Aviation by Jim Burin, Flight Safety Foundation
• Flightdeck Image Recording on Commercial Aircraft
by Pippa Moore, CAA, UK
• Flightdeck Image Recording on Commercial Aircraft
by Mike Horne, AD Aerospace, Ltd., Manchester, UK
• An Analysis of the Relationship of Finding-Cause-
Recommendation from Selected Recent NTSB Aircraft
Accident Reports by Michael Huhn, Air Line Pilots
Association. Presented by Chris Baum.
• Ramp Accidents and Incidents Involving U.S.
Carriers, 1987-2002 by Robert Matthews, FAA, USA
SESSION VI Keynote Address Accident Investigation in
Brazil by Col. Marcus A. Araújo da Costa, Chief Aeronautical
Accident Prevention and Investigation Center (CENIPA), Brazil
• Airline Safety Data: Where Are We and Where Are We
Going? by Timothy J. Logan, Southwest Airlines
• Use of Computed Tomography Imaging in Accident
Investigation by Scott A. Warren, NTSB, USA
• Investigating Survival Factors in Aircraft Accidents:
Revisiting the Past to Look to the Future by Thomas A.
Farrier, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.
• The Accident Database of the Cabin Safety Research
Technical Group by Ray Cherry, R.G.W. Cherry & Associates
Limited, UK
• Search & Recovery: The Art and Science by Steven Saint
Amour, Phoenix International, Inc.
• National Transportation Safety Board Recommenda-
tions Relating to Inflight Fire Emergencies by Mark
George, NTSB, USA
2003 Annual Seminar Proceedings Now Available
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Charles O. Miller, “Chuck” or “C.O.,” as he was more commonly known,
embarked on his final flight west on Oct. 20, 2003, from a hospital in
Massillon, Ohio. He died of pneumonia and respiratory failure. He be-
came a member of the Society of Air Safety Investigators in 1968 and
maintained continuous membership until his passing. Survivors include
his wife of 53 years, Ilene Falls Miller of Wooster; five children, Sandra
Miller Koeller of West Bend, Wisc.; Cheryl Miller Davis of Wooster;
Deborah Miller Rylant of Santa Maria, Calif.; and Janice Miller Grimes
and Kenneth Bartlett Miller, both of Herndon; and 13 grandchildren.
While his reputation as an air safety advocate extraordinaire was known
far and wide, the deep spirit of his dedication to making flight safe is no
better known to any group than the air safety investigators of ISASI. This
article, prepared from material he presented at the ISASI annual seminar
of October1982, is published as a tribute to his allegiance to the Society, its
purpose, and its members.—EditorOne of the indices of self-recognition as well as publicrecognition of the professional status of any group isthat group’s adherence to a specified doctrine of be-
havior. To this end, a Code of Ethics and Conduct was begun
several years ago and has undergone numerous modifications
through inputs from a wide cross-section of Society members.
It is now completed and following is its developmental path
explaining its rationale and intent.
The Society of Air Safety Investigators, forefather of ISASI,
was incorporated in the District of Columbia on Aug. 31, 1964.
On Oct. 11, 1978, SASI became ISASI and articles were de-
veloped to form the basis of agreement between the interna-
tional society and member societies. Within those articles, the
parties agreed “to abstain from conduct deleterious to the interest of
the Air Safety Investigators profession or which falls below the stan-
dards established by the Code of Ethics of the International Society
of Air Safety Investigators.”
The Constitution of the Society also speaks to a Code under
Article VI, Termination and Reinstatement of Membership:
“A member of the International Society shall be subject to suspension
or expulsion…for unethical professional conduct or for willful con-
duct contrary to the Code of Ethics of the International Society….”
It is obvious from the foregoing that current Society func-
tioning, let alone the precepts on which the Society was
founded, presupposes the existence of a doctrine related to
both the ethics and conduct of Society members, and the will-
ingness of the Society to discipline breaches thereof.
However, the Code of Ethics drafted by Stan Mohler and for-
warded to the Council in 1976 languished in “deliberation”
until Laurie Edwards amplified on the work done by Mohler
and forwarded it to this author in March 1981. The material
contained a remarkable number of detailed standards of
conduct…a tribute to the astute thought processes of Stan
and Laurie.
The only problem then…was the presence of too many good
ideas. Thus, the main task remaining was to structure the in-
formation so as to simplify matter (albeit add one’s own ideas,
which is the prerogative of the people who agree to be com-
mittee chairmen).
In preparation for the rewrite of the Code, reviews were made
of codes pertaining to other fields of endeavor, including the
Code of Ethics for the (U.S.) Government Service, the Board
of Certified Safety Professionals, the American Society of Me-
chanical Engineers, the American Society for Quality Con-
trol, and the American Bar Association.
The result was a decision to delineate “Ethics” from “Con-
duct” by keeping the Ethics broad, simple, and few in num-
ber. As mentioned in the preamble to the Ethic and Code, eth-
ics are aspirational. They are goals toward which we all “should”
strive. Being broad, they do not contain the kind of words
that adequately reflect criteria against which a member’s con-
duct could be judged for disciplinary reason, if it ever came to
that. Statements of Conduct fulfill that need. They are the
“shall” of member behavior.
ISASI Code of Conduct Genesis
By C.O. Miller
About the Author
Chuck Miller, 79, was born in Cleveland, Ohio. A multi-
sport varsity athlete and president of his high school’s
National Honor Society, he enlisted in the Navy’s avia-
tion cadet program on his 18th birthday. He subse-
quently became a Marine Corps night fighter pilot
during World War II. His university-level education
includes a B.S. in aeronautical engineering from MIT
(1949), an M.S. in system management from USC
(1967), and a J.D. from the Potomac School of Law
(1980). He was a registered professional engineer-safety (California 1976).
• Professional Experience—Upon graduation from MIT, he became
a flight test engineer with the Douglas Aircraft Company at Muroc
(now Edwards) Air Force Base, assigned to the D-558-II “Skyrocket”
research project. Fourteen months later, he became a test pilot with the
Chance Vought Aircraft Corp. (CVA) developing guidance systems and
“flying” the world’s first operational cruise missile, “Regulus,” from
single and two-place aircraft, from the ground and from submarines.
In late 1953, he became staff engineer, cockpit design and flight safety
at CVA. Specific safety positions he subsequently occupied were special
assistant to the director, Flight Safety Foundation (1962-63), lecturer
and director of research at USC’s Aerospace Safety Institute (1963-68),
director of the Bureau of Aviation Safety of the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board (1968-74), president and principal consultant of Sys-
tem Safety, Inc. (1974-93). Consultant clients included government
agencies in the United States and abroad, airlines, manufacturers, trade
associations, attorneys, and congressional committees. He wrote ap-
proximately 125 professional papers and two books. He lectured fre-
quently internationally and taught courses at George Washington Uni-
versity and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) and USC.
• Career Highlights—He was best known for his interdisciplinary and
systems approach to accident prevention. For example, he was a princi-
pal developer of the advanced safety management course at USC in
the mid-1960s, which later evolved into system safety courses taught
there and elsewhere. He was granted the prestigious “Fellow” ranking
by four major technical societies: the American Institute of Aeronautics
(AIAA), the Human Factors Society (HFS), the International Society of
Air Safety Investigators (ISASI), and the System Safety Society (SSS).
He was retained by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in its inquiry
into the Three Mile Island accident. u
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Examination of the Code of Ethics and Conduct reveals the
logic developed that provides the items of Conduct as subsets
of five Ethics whose key words are Integrity, Principles, Objec-
tivity, Logic, and Accident Prevention. These categories are
somewhat arbitrary and subject to challenges inherent in any
classification system. The Ethic/Conduct hierarchy was deemed
necessary, however, to ensure an organized approach to the
44 statements of conduct, which, if left standing by themselves,
would cause undue reader confusion.
Code review
During earlier drafts of the document, liaison was maintained
with Stan Mohler and Laurie Edwards. Coordination was ac-
complished with Gerry Bruggink, Les Kerfoot, and all mem-
bers of the Executive Council. All ISASI national societies and
chapters had the opportunity to comment, and reviews were
done by Jerry Lederer and Ludi Benner, both well-respected
members of the air safety profession. Of all the responses,
only one expressed disapproval of the document in the total
sense because it would be “impossible to comply.”
Substantive comments tended to identify three issues that
merit consideration:
• The overall degree of detail or complexity of the Code as
presently constituted. Is it excessive?
• The degree to which the Code relates to accident preven-
tion rather than to pure fact-finding tasks attendant to the
investigative process.
• The possible conflict between provision of this Code and
other obligations of members base upon their particular em-
ployment or other codes that they are obligated to follow.
The Executive Council determined after review of comments
in hand by July 23, [1982], that they did not merit further
1. INTEGRITY Each Member should at all times conduct
his activities in accordance with the high standards of integ-
rity required of his profession. Each Member shall:
1.1 Not attempt, or assist others to attempt, to falsify, conceal, or
destroy any facts or evidence which may relate to an accident.
1.2 Not make any misrepresentations of fact to obtain infor-
mation that would otherwise be denied to him.
1.3 Be responsive to the feelings, sensibilities, and emotions
of involved persons, and shall avoid actions which might ag-
gravate what may already be a delicate situation.
1.4 Not divulge fragmentary or unsupported information
concerning the accident to parties external to the investiga-
tion no matter how publicly important such parties may ap-
pear to be.
1.5 Avoid actions or comments which might be reasonably
perceived during the fact-finding phase of the investigation
as favoring one party or another.
1.6 Establish and adhere to the chain of authority with attendant
responsibilities throughout the course of the investigation.
1.7 Not attempt to profit, nor accept profit, other than by nor-
mal processes of remuneration for professional services. (Note:
Fee-splitting in the absence of actual work performed or acceptance of
contingency fees for investigative activity are not acceptable conduct.)
1.8 Remain open-minded to the introduction of new evidence
or opinions as to interpretation of facts as determined through
analysis, and be willing to revise one’s own findings accordingly.
1.9 Avoid any implication of professional impropriety by con-
tinuously applying the foregoing principles to one’s own en-
deavors, and encouraging the application of these same prin-
ciples to others associated with air safety investigation.
2. PRINCIPLES Each Member should respect and ad-
here to the principles on which ISASI was founded and devel-
oped, as illustrated by the Society’s Bylaws. Each Member shall:
ISASI CODE OFCONDUCT
2.1 Promote accident investigation as a fundamental element
in accident prevention.
2.2 Assist other Members to carry out their accident investi-
gation tasks.
2.3 Not use membership status to effect personal gain or favor
beyond signifying qualification to published membership criteria.
2.4 Not represent the Society or imply a position of the Soci-
ety in public utterances on any issue unless prior written au-
thority has been received from the Society President.
2.5 Seek advice of the International Council, via the Secre-
tary, in the event a situation arises where contemplated con-
duct by the Member may violate the Bylaws or Code of Ethics
and Conduct of the Society.
2.6 Submit evidence of violations of the ISASI Bylaws or this
Code to the Society’s Ethics and Conduct Committee in accor-
dance with procedures approved by the International Coun-
cil, and refrain from public discussion of the alleged violation
until the Committee findings have become a matter of appro-
priate record.
2.7 Encourage uninhibited, informal interchange of views
among Members; however, any sensitive information thus
gained shall not be made public or transmitted to others with-
out clear approval of the person from whom the information
was gained.
2.8 Have an obligation to improve the professional image of
the Society; however, Members shall:
2.8.1 Refrain from unfounded criticism of officers of the Soci-
ety either publicly or privately unless the matter is investi-
gated thoroughly and brought to the attention of the Presi-
dent with reasonable time being allocated to review the situa-
tion and act accordingly.
2.8.2 Refrain from public criticism of any fellow Member un-
less that individual has first been apprised of the alleged basis
for that criticism and given an opportunity for rebuttal.
2.9 Encourage and participate in the education, training, and
indoctrination of personnel likely to become involved actively
in accident investigation.
2.10 Develop and implement a personal program for a con-
tinually improving level of professional knowledge applicable
to air safety investigation.
2.11 Transfer promptly to the Treasurer of the Society any Soci-
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ety funds or property coming into the Member’s possession un-
less specific use thereof has been authorized under the Bylaws.
3. OBJECTIVITY Each Member should lend emphasis
to objective determination of facts during investigations. Each
Member shall:
3.1 Ensure that all items presented as facts reflect honest per-
ceptions or physical evidence that have been checked insofar
as practicable for accuracy.
3.2 Ensure that each item of information leading to fact de-
termination be documented or otherwise identified for a rea-
sonable time for possible follow-up by others.
3.3 Use the best available expertise and equipment in deter-
mining the validity of information.
3.4 Pursue fact determination expeditiously.
3.5 Following all avenues of fact determination, which appear
to have practical value towards achieving accident prevention
action.
3.6 Avoid speculation except in the sense of presenting a hy-
pothesis for testing during the fact-finding and analysis process.
3.7 Refrain from release of factual information publicly ex-
cept to authorized persons, by authorized methods, and then
only when it does not jeopardize the overall investigation.
3.8 Handle with discretion any information reflecting adversely
on persons or organizations and, when the information is rea-
sonably established, notify such persons or organizations of
potential criticism before it becomes a matter of public record.
4. LOGIC Each Member should develop all accident cause-
effect relationships meaningful to air safety based on logical
application of facts. Each Member shall:
4.1 Begin sufficiently upstream in each sequence of events so
as to ascertain practicable accident prevention information.
4.2 Continue downstream in a sequence of events sufficiently
to include not only accident prevention information but also
crash injury prevention, search, and survival information.
4.3 Ensure that all safety-meaningful facts, however small, are
related to all sequences of events.
4.4 Delineate those major facts deemed not to be safety-re-
lated, explaining why they should not be considered as criti-
cal in the sequences of events.
4.5 Be particularly alert to value judgments based upon personal
experiences which may influence the analysis; and where suspect,
turn to colleagues for independent assessment of the facts.
4.6 Express the sequences in simple, clear terms which may be
understood by persons not specializing in a particular discipline.
4.7 Include specialist material supporting the analysis either
in an appendix or as references clearly identified as to source
and availability.
4.8 Prepare illustrative material and select photographs so as
not to present misleading significance of the data or facts thus
portrayed.
4.9 List all documents examined or otherwise associated with
the analysis and include an index thereof.
5. ACCIDENT PREVENTION Each Member should
apply facts and analyses to develop findings and recommen-
dations that will improve aviation safety. Each Member shall:
5.1 Identify from the investigation those cause-effect relation-
ships about which something can be done reasonably to pre-
vent similar accidents.
5.2 Document those aviation system shortcomings learned
during an investigation which, while not causative in the acci-
dent in question, are hazards requiring further study and/or
remedial action.
5.3 Communicate facts, analyses, and findings to those people
or organizations which may use such information effectively;
such communication to be constrained only by established
policies and procedures of the employer of the Member.
5.4 Provide specific, practical recommendations for remedial
action when supported by the findings of the accident having
been investigated singly or as supported by other cases.
5.5 Communicate the above-noted information in writing,
properly identified as a matter of record.
5.6 Encourage retention of relevant investigation evidence
within the aviation system in such a manner as to form an effec-
tive baseline for further investigation of the given accident and/
or facilitate analysis in connection with future accidents.
5.7 Demonstrate a respect for interpretation of facts by others
when developing conclusions regarding a given accident and
provide reasonable opportunity for such views to be made
known during the course of the investigation.
delaying in getting the Code into circulation. In the past, the
delays in processing the Code resulted from infinite piecemeal
attempts to improve the Code language by a select few per-
sons. Now, after two major rewrites, it was recognized that the
Code may still merit changes, but not to the degree to warrant
circulation delay. Further, it was envisioned that 100 percent
agreement on all aspects of the Code would never be attained.
Final thought
One of the documents encountered in the course of this project
was an unpublished paper examining “professionals” from a
sociological and historical viewpoint. When discussing how
professions formed, the paper noted in part: “A person did not
‘learn’ a profession. He ‘made’ a profession. The profession was his
free and open declaration of his acceptance of the duties of his
calling.…He stood in front of his townspeople and publicly professed
that because of the special knowledge now reposed in him, he had a
special duty to discharge on their behalf. He professed a duty of truth,
of professional judgment, as he might call it today, and a duty not to
hide his substantial knowledge when they should require it.” (Carol
Benson: Ethical considerations for the System Safety Professional).
Those thoughts would seem to have a bearing on anyone
still reluctant to place an ISASI Code of Ethics and Conduct before
the public. Furthermore, “duty” speaks to those members who
are troubled over competing obligations as might be found in
the Code. To resolve such a conflict, perhaps it is just a matter of
how professional one cares to be. (The International Council
went on to adopt the Code of Ethics and Conduct, with minor
changes, as developed by C.O. Miller in collaboration with the
others mentioned in the article. Following is ISASI’s current
Code of Ethics and Conduct, which has remained unchanged since
its adoption in October 1983.—Editor)
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(This article was adapted, with permission, from the author’s presen-
tation entitled “Accident Reconstruction—The Decision Process,” pre-
sented at the ISASI 2003 seminar in Washington D.C., USA, Au-
gust 2003. The full presentation is available on the ISASI website at
http://www.isasi.org.—Editor)During my more than two decades of accident investi-gation experience, several issues have increasinglygnawed at the back of my mind. One of those is what
I perceive as the seemingly haphazard industry process for
construction is an excellent investigative tool when used prop-
erly. It can be the key for determining the existence of clues
leading to the causes of the event. It can eliminate certain ideas
as well. Some of the things you may be looking for can include
• structural inflight breakup—breakup patterns, sequence,
loss of parts, etc.
• progress and effects of fire, smoke, and heat—fire or smoke
patterns
• missile or gun projectile, meteor hits, space debris, etc.
• mid-air collision
About the author: John Purvis is an internation-
ally recognized expert in large aircraft accident
investigations. For 41 years, he worked at the
Boeing Company, leading Boeing’s commercial
airplane investigative team for 17 years. When he
retired at the end of 1998, he and his partner,
Kevin Darcy, formed an aviation safety consulting
business, Safety Services International (SSI). He is currently in-
structing at the Southern California Safety Institute and is a mem-
ber of its Advisory Board. In 2001, he earned ISASI’s prestigious
Jerome F. Lederer Award for outstanding contributions to the
industry and in 2003 was bestowed “Fellow” status in ISASI. Aft pressure bulkhead 3-D mockup (JAL B-747, 1985).
Accident Reconstruction andIts Decision Process
The author examines current mockup practices of major portions of an
airplane, suggests certain steps the investigator can take to ensure there is value
in doing a reconstruction, and looks to the future for new ideas.
By John W. Purvis (MO3002), Partner, Safety Services Internationa
deciding when to reconstruct wreckage as part of an accident
investigation. In my quest for information, I approached many
of the world’s leading investigators and discovered, not to my
surprise, that the decision process for reconstruction is very
loose and poorly documented. Sometime mockups or recon-
structions just seem to happen.
There seemed to be general agreement that the system
could, and should, be improved.
But before we get into the details, let’s define what we are
talking about. In my mind the words mockup and reconstruction
are one in the same, and I have used always used them inter-
changeably. The words denote part of the system of collecting
physical wreckage from land or under water, sorting it, usu-
ally by airplane section, and after a period of investigation,
laying it out in some organized fashion. However, this article
is restricted to the mockup and its decision process—what
happens after the parts are recovered. It will not include ma-
terial about the actual recovery process of the physical wreck-
age, or even the initial sorting process.
So, why do a reconstruction in the first place? Clearly, a re-
• overpressure, such as from a bomb or other explosion
• chemical residue of an explosive device
• missing pieces
• interactions between different airplane systems
On the other hand, even if the causes of the accident have
already been established, the mockup can play an important
role in preventing a similar situation. For example, if you sus-
pect there was a bomb in a cargo hold, the mockup may lead
you to look at a breakup sequence and help you determine
where to make changes to the airplane or its operating proce-
dures to control venting so that the overpressure won’t cause
catastrophic structural damage. Or you could develop stron-
ger cargo containers or other means to control the overpres-
sure. Here are some technical issues that may support a need
for reconstruction:
• Evidence from full body X-rays and autopsies, burns, and
smoke inhalation
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• Search for explosives
• Evidence of fire and smoke on the structures and systems—
the need to determine origin and progress patterns
• Parts found some distance from the wreckage sites
• Major missing parts
• Evidence from other systems analysis
• Evidence derived from a basic, simple layout
Mockup types
What kind of mockups are we talking about? There are sev-
roof would be driven by the expected length of the investiga-
tion and the weather. For technical information, you’ll need a
diagram, probably from the manufacturer, of the area
under study.
For example, in the Air Florida 737 accident in 1982, where
the airplane ended up in the Potomac River near Washing-
ton, D.C., we had an entire hangar floor available and were
able to lay out the parts of the airplane as they were recovered
from the River. As this developed, we were able to visualize
what we had, what was missing, and where the basic parts of
Limited 3-D mockup applying to a specific area in question
(UAL DC-10, Souix City).
the airplane had separated. Eventually, other information from
the investigation such as the recorders began to supercede
the need for a layout and this effort was halted. However,
given the high profile of the accident and the unknown situa-
tion in the early days of the investigation, it was a prudent
first step to take. The decision to proceed was made by the
IIC after consulting with his group chairmen.
Once the tape measure and chalk have been used to mark
the outline of the area to be mocked up, putting down mask-
ing tape will help with the visualization. Another trick would
be to “scale up” the area being looked at. Scaling-up means
providing additional space between the pieces by enlarging
the space allotted for the layout by up to 20 percent. This
allows you to walk between the pieces to visualize/examine
them as well as facilitate moving the parts into position. It will
also ensure that torn edges will not rub one another and dam-
age the fracture surfaces or remove other evidence. Further, it
will provide extra space for laying out the upper and lower
surfaces in the same area, although for detailed layouts sepa-
rate areas would be used for the two surfaces. A 2-D mockup
can eventually be converted to a 3-D mockup, if needed.
3-D mockups—These can be the ultimate in physical recon-
struction, depending on their extent. However, going to a 3-D
mockup is not for the feint of heart, and it comes with politi-
cal overtones. The costs rise astronomically because of the
demands for space and manpower. The physical facilities will
be in use longer because of the length of time the mockup will
be under construction and preserved. Some large 3-D mockups
may require the formation of a separate “reconstruction group”
to staff and manage the process. Further, significant effort will
be expended on a database to track the parts being hung on
the frame. On a major reconstruction, the frame alone can
cost tens of thousands of dollars. The overall cost for a major
mockup can run into several millions of dollars.
On the positive side, a 3-D mockup has distinct advantages
that no other investigative tool offers. It can show the pres-
ence or absence of causes, such as penetration or missile im-
eral, each having increased complexity. The reconstruction
can be as simple as a reassembly of just a few significant pieces
of wreckage. This would typically be done on a hangar floor
to examine a limited area of the airplane. It’s a basic 2-D lay-
out, done flat on the hangar floor, or even a simple 3-D con-
struction. Graduating from there would be a more complex
2-D layout where more of the airplane is laid out on the floor.
Finally, there is the complex 3-D mockup, either of a limited
section or system of the airplane or a rebuild of an entire
section. Let’s examine these one by one.
Basic, simple layout—The decision process is likewise simple.
The mockup might be done as, say, a structural group activity,
with the group chairman making the decision. The cost of
such a layout can be very low since it could be accomplished
with existing personnel and in existing space. Some sort of a
layout like this is done in most accidents. Potentially, this can
be as basic as laying out a few pieces to visualize their relation-
ships, to look for witness marks, or to examine burn or smoke
patterns. In many cases, this may be all that is necessary to
assist the investigator in determining probable cause. The
simple layout is often the starting point for a more formal
decision to go further. All mockups have the added benefit of
providing a visual inventory of the wreckage recovered.
Comprehensive 2-D mockup—These are also commonly
done and can be extensive but still quite cost effective. The
tools to make a larger 2-D mockup can be a tape measure,
masking tape, some chalk, a clean floor, and basic technical
information. It can be indoors or outdoors. The need for a
A reconstruction is an excellent
investigative tool when used properly.
It can be the key for determining
the existence of clues leading to the
causes of the event. It can eliminate
certain ideas as well.
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pact. It will create sightlines that could provide other clues.
These may help reduce or eliminate outside pet theories. On
the other hand, it may allow an insight that didn’t exist be-
fore. It may eliminate or confirm potential criminal activity. It
can give a good visualization of missing pieces. Three-dimen-
sional relationships are easier to visualize, especially those in-
volving fire or smoke patterns or curling and bending of parts.
Resources and costs
However, not all areas of the world are created equal. Some
Below is a list of some accidents that involved 3-D recon-
structions. It is far from a comprehensive list but rather pre-
sented as examples where large mockups were used.
• Swissair 111, MD-11 (forward fuselage)
• Air France, Concorde (fuel tanks and wings)
• TWA 800, 747 (center fuselage/center wing tank)
• United Sioux City, DC-10 (center engine/tail)
• Pan Am Lockerbie, 747 (center fuselage)
• ValuJet, DC-9 (cargo compartment)
Virtual mockups—As computer power grows and methods
Jig/frame for Swissair MD-11 3-D mockup (photo courtesy
TSB Canada).
of digitizing objects improve, there is a growing interest in the
virtual mockup, along the line of computer-aided design (CAD
programs) currently used to design parts or manufacturing
processes. Much of the software is still being developed, but
investigators need to understand what is waiting in the wings.
At this time, a virtual mockup is typically being done after the
3-D mockup is in place. It is good for cataloguing the rescued
pieces and determining what may be missing. It provides an-
other option for the investigator, but its cost and pros and
cons are still to be determined.
One of the possible downsides of this new technology is the
ability to manipulate digitized data and the need for systems
that ensure absolute data security.
During ISASI 2003, engineers from the Aviation Safety
Council (ASC) of Taiwan presented an excellent paper. It ex-
plained the use of their impressive Three Dimensional Soft-
ware Reconstruction and Presentation System (3D-SWRPS)
in the CI611 747 accident. The ASC has done an amazing job
—because of their effort the future is here, right now.
Eventually, it will be possible to jump directly to a virtual
mockup, bypassing the need for a physical 2-D or 3-D mockup.
Consider this: we take our digitizing devices to the accident
site and digitize the wreckage through a photographic or la-
ser process by taking multiple views of each piece of wreck-
age. These are then manipulated onto a 3-D view of each part
and applied to a virtual frame. The technique will first be-
come common with land-based accidents because the pieces
poorer States may not have the technical capabilities to ac-
complish a major reconstruction. More importantly, they may
not have the financial resources to pay for such an unusual
effort.
What is the answer to this costs and resources dilemma?
Some years ago, I presented a paper entitled “Who Should
Bear the Burden for Extraordinary Investigative Costs?” (ISASI
seminar, Boston, Proceedings 1999, page 30). The same ideas
that were outlined to assist with recovery costs could be ap-
plied to mockups, since they could also be considered extraor-
dinary. These solutions might include worldwide insurance
or a fund supported by governments or a service tax. Indeed,
the NTSB has proposed to ICAO that means be found to
help with costs of extraordinary investigations.
One fact stands out bold and clear: In my search for inputs
from various experts, I found that large 3-D mockups often
do not add much to the technical understanding, and it is
difficult to keep them simple, safe, and uncluttered. My ex-
perts seem to think that an extensive mockup is rarely re-
quired for a technical investigation. Rather, 3-D mockups are
important for show and tell. Such a mock is “sexy” from the
media standpoint, and makes excellent fodder for the media
and politicians. Moreover, it can create both public and politi-
cal support for the investigative agency seeking recognition,
budget, or manpower. Clearly, and appreciably—there can be
good and valid reasons and demands, besides technical, that
may sway a decision for a mockup.
Along with this, it seems that once a major mockup gets
started, it is difficult to stop the momentum, even if the thrust
of the investigation changes. The decision process of where to
stop and how much of the airplane you really need should be
determined ahead of time by the right people involved in the
investigation. At the same time, there must be flexibility and
understanding if the plan needs to be altered or reversed.
Quite often, the floor space occupied by a 3-D mockup
could be more productive for other uses. Cost, space, and
manpower are only part of the consideration. What will you
do with this expensive edifice once the investigation is no
longer necessary?
The decision process of where to stop
and how much of the airplane youreally need should be determined ahead
of time by the right people involved
in the investigation.
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can be easily accessed and digitized. Eventually, the technol-
ogy may allow us to go under water using remotely operated
vehicles, digitizing parts in place, thus eliminating the need
of bringing them to the surface. Further it may be possible to
do very close up digitizing of fracture surfaces, burn patterns,
and other features and apply them to the frame separately.
Let’s not fool ourselves. As mentioned previously, there are
many non-technical reasons for building some form of
mockup, especially a 3-D mockup. As investigators, we prob-
ably don’t like to hear that the process can be driven by any-
thing but the need for technical information, but it seems to
be true. Politics and pressures from the public, families, and
media all play roles in whether to build a mockup and how far
to take it. There seems to be a desire on the part of the inves-
tigative agencies to show off their work. It has public relations
value. The grand 3-D mockup has value in obtaining budget,
and it could even play a role in personal image building.
While these are major driving reasons to do a 3-D mockup,
investigative teams usually underestimate them. Yet, all of
these may be valid reasons—if they are accepted by the in-
vestigative team as priorities during the planning stages. The
time, cost, and manpower factors need to be understood
and a determination made that there are no better ways to
use affected resources. Here is a summary of some of the
resources required:
• Additional parts may be needed
• Hangar space and roofing needs
• Money, and lots of it
• Labor
• Consider an “expanded” mockup—where you make the lay-
out larger than the original design to allow room for interi-
ors, visualization, analysis, and access
• Time
• Management support
• A safe physical frame (3D) designed for the job and with space
for adding interiors, carpets, seats, systems, etc., if necessary
• Knowledgeable, professional help (say to build a good frame)
• Multiple mockups (2D or 3D) to cover separate systems or
areas of the airplane
• Know where the mockup’s final resting place will be—and
have a design that allows it to be relocated
So, where are we? In the ideal world, the decision process
would be technically based and made primarily by the techni-
cal team of investigators. Economics would not play a role.
Politics and public pressures would be minimal. The decision
to move ahead with a simple 2-D or 3-D mockup would prove
to be wise and produce valuable results. (It would “solve” the
accident.) The decision to halt the process would be accept-
able at any point without retribution.
But we live in a real world. Mockups may not be as valuable
as hoped, especially 3-D mockups, when considering the time,
money, and effort spent to create them and the space they
occupy. I was surprised to discover in my research that there
are no well-thought-out, formal plans for the full process. Once
a decision has been made to construct a mockup, it is difficult
to stop or change direction. The extent of the reconstructions
often exceeds technical needs. Finally, when the mockups are
complete, they can take on lives of their own beyond the con-
sideration of technical value. No one has thought about “what
are we going to do with it?” It can become a monument, a
museum piece, or an expensive white elephant looking for a
home.
Decision process
The decision process for constructing a mockup is just a small
part of the overall management of an investigation. Typically,
project management oversight includes the resources and their
allocation, the people and their assignments, budget, travel,
and research. This should also include, as a distinct and sepa-
rate item, the reconstruction decision process. In my search, I
could not find any organization with an existing formal pro-
cess setting out the ground rules and decision process leading
to a “go” or “no go” of a reconstruction. Mostly, I found it was
a “seat of the pants” decision process, handed down infor-
mally over the years and accomplished somewhat haphazardly
in the heat of the battle. As mentioned earlier, sometimes
mockups seem to—just happen.
To improve the process, consider the following:
• It is a major decision; act accordingly
• Think about what you have, what you need (and what of
that you can reasonably expect to get), and what you are try-
ing to accomplish
• Consider delaying the mockup decision process while other
facets of the investigation proceed; it may turn out you don’t
need one
• Involve all the interested parties in the decision process
• Attempt to minimize the effects of politics, cost, time, and
space requirements or, at least, understand them
• Proceed up the chain, starting with a basic 2-D construc-
tion and do it in a logical, well-planned way
• Avoid making it an open-ended research project
• Have a plan and stick with it
• Have an end point in mind
The bottom line is the same: Have a process and follow it.
This article is a distillation of my thoughts garnered over
45 years of aviation experience and supplemented by gener-
ous inputs from numerous expert investigators from all over
the world. But it is not the ultimate word on the reconstruc-
tion decision process; rather it is but one step in an attempt to
get investigators to think about where they are going before
launching off on an expensive and time-consuming project
that ultimately may be unnecessary. We live in a rapidly chang-
ing world, which is progressing far more quickly than we can
track individually. Thanks to venues like the ISASI annual
seminar, we can learn from each other. u
Typically, project management oversight
includes the resources and their
allocation, the people and their assign-
ments, budget, travel, and research.
This should also include, as a distinct
and separate item, the reconstruction
decision process.
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(This article was adapted, with permission, from the authors’ presen-
tation entitled “Application of the 3-D Software Wreckage Reconstruc-
tion Technology at the Aircraft Accident Investigation,” presented at
the ISASI 2003 seminar in Washington, D.C., USA, August 2003.
The full presentation is available on the ISASI website at http://
www.isasi.org.—Editor)
Authors’ comments: Presented here is a methodology and application of
a Three-Dimensional-Software-Reconstruction and Presentation System
(3D-SWRPS). This system was developed to support the investigation of
the China Airlines Flight CI611 inflight breakup accident that occurred
on May 25, 2002. The accident aircraft was a B-747-200 carrying 19
crewmembers and 206 passengers. The accident occurred near Penghu
Island in the Taiwan Strait. All 225 people on board the aircraft perished
in this accident. The Aviation Safety Council (ASC), an independent
government organization responsible for all civil aircraft accident and
serious incident investigation in Taiwan, has been investigating the acci-
dent. At the time of this writing, this investigation is still ongoing and
probable causes of this accident have not yet been determined.When an aircraft accident happens, investigation be-gins on scene: searching for and subsequent read-out of the flight recorders, gathering relevant fac-
tual data, drafting analytical topics, finding out probable
causes, and proposing safety recommendations, etc.
That work process is familiar to everyone in this field; how-
ever, for an inflight breakup accident such as Pan American
Flight 103 (PA103, 747-100), Trans World Airlines Flight 800
(TWA800, 747-141), or Swissair Flight 111 (SR111, MD-11),
wreckage reconstruction becomes an important means to help
achieve factual evidence collection and subsequent analyses.
There are several relevant applications associated with wreck-
age reconstruction: finite element analysis (FEA), for the re-
search of structure stress and metal fatigue; computational
fluid dynamics (CFD), for verification of flow fields; evalua-
tion of human-mechanics interface and flight controls by en-
gineering flight simulators. For example, in hard landing in-
vestigations for a MD-11 and EMB-145, FEA was used to ex-
amine the stress of landing gears and support structures. After
the Air France Concorde accident in 2000, academic research-
ers at the University of Leeds applied CFD to analyze the
Concorde’s phenomenon of combustible stabilization .
Thanks to the advanced technology, the application of 3-D
surveying technology provides an even better way to promote
the efficiency and cost savings of wreckage reconstruction. This
so-called 3-D surveying technology aims the precise 3-D laser
scanner at an object to measure its tangent planes, then aligns
these planes with selected reference points of alignment to
assemble them into complete a 3-D model.
The methodology and application of 3D-SWRPS can also
be used for future accident investigation in the areas of three-
dimensional site survey, in secluded mountain area, or inside
an airport, to determine the distributional relationship of
wreckage and terrain.
Investigation and wreckage reconstruction
Aviation accident investigation integrates the technologies of
aerospace, avionics, human factor, flight operation, weather,
underwater recovery, spatial remote sensing (global position
system, geographic information system, remote sensing), etc.
ICAO Annex 13 generally dictates the investigation proce-
dures for the determination of causal factors, and for propos-
ing safety recommendations for the prevention of similar oc-
currences from happening again.
The investigation of an aviation accident as a whole con-
tains six phases: on-scene investigation, factual data collec-
tion, factual verification, analysis, findings, and safety recom-
mendations. The size of the investigation team depends on
the nature and severity of the occurrence. A typical investiga-
tion team should include groups of flight operations, flight
recorders, air traffic control, weather, airport, maintenance,
survival factors, human factors, systems, and logistics.
The most difficult accident investigation in terms of budget
and logistic is an over water investigation, which requires under-
water recovery of the recorders and wreckages. For an inflight
breakup accident, wreckage reconstruction becomes very infor-
mational helpful in the determination of causal factors. In the
past decade, aviation accident investigation agencies have ag-
gressively sought an efficient method of wreckage reconstruc-
tion but without significant development. In the last 15 years
there were six inflight breakup accidents: PA103, AA811, TWA800,
SR111, Air France’s Concorde, and China Airlines CI611. As
summarized in Table 1, wreckage reconstructions were conducted
for the determination of their probable causes.
About the principal author: Michael Guan holds both M.S. and
Ph.D. degrees from the Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics of
the Cheng-Kung University in Taiwan, ROC. He started his
investigation career in July 1998. Since the establishment of the
ASC, he is responsible for setting up the investigation lab in the
ASC. Guan is currently the deputy chief of the lab. In his 5-year
career with the ASC, he has participated in more than 20 investiga-
tions in flight recorders and airplane performance. Most of the
accidents and serious incidents happened in Taiwan.
Applying3-D SWRPSTechnology
Using a combination of the computer
3-D-graphic techniques and laser scanning,
this newly developed Three-Dimensional-
Software-Reconstruction and Presentation
System can provide sub-centimeter accuracy
in the wreckage reconstruction process and
can be used to determine fracture behavior
and propagation of stress of break up.
By Wen-Lin, Guan, Victor Liang , Phil Tai, and
Kay Yong, Aviation Safety Council, ROC
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But irrespective of whether an aircraft crashed on land or
into the sea, after salvaging the wreckage, investigators need
to identify and examine the wreckage pieces one by one. When
the source of force and destructive direction of structure could
not be determined, then reconstruction using the wreckage
collected is a viable method.
In general, to evaluate probable causes, determination of the
failure sequence is required. However, not all accidents need
wreckage reconstruction. For example, in the case of Singapore
Airlines Flight 006 (SQ006), which crashed on the runway at
Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport in Taiwan on Oct. 31,
2000, its structure failure sequence could be determined by
ground collision marks and wreckage distribution, and hence
did not require reconstruction of the wreckages.
Wreckage reconstruction serves three purposes: first, to find
out the source of structure failure; second, to judge the endur-
ance of the condition of forces; and third, to study the propa-
gation of stress or force between main structures. Several prepa-
ration considerations are required prior to the wreckage recon-
struction: 1) Evaluation of the re-
construction site; 2) Identification
and tagging of wreckages; 3) Par-
tial or whole wreckage reconstruc-
tion; 4) 2-D wreckage layout or
3-D wreckage reconstruction; 5)
Design of frame or mockup; 6)
Wreckage cut up and crane op-
eration; 7) Accessibility to the
mockup; and 8) Safety concerns
of personnel at work. etc.
The determination of whether
to undertake a partial or whole
wreckage reconstruction is an
important issue. A decision
should be made according to
clues and factual information
collected during the on-scene
investigation phase. These clues
can usually be radar tracks, flight
recorder data, related testimo-
nies, and characteristics of sal-
vaged wreckages. Those charac-
teristics include failure condi-
tions at different sections of the
fuselage, burning conditions,
and fracture surfaces, etc.
For example, after the inflight
breakup of TWA800, the pri-
mary radar data display indi-
cated that wreckages followed
the flightpath spread along the
downwind side. In interviews,
testimonies such as “fireball and
descending” appeared. There
were abnormality and high-en-
ergy sound waves recorded in the
cockpit voice recorder. There-
fore, wreckage reconstruction of
TWA800 emphasized finding
the source of explosion; hence, the reconstruction was focused
on the fuselage and central fuel tanks sections.
Furthermore, after the inflight breakup of SR111, primary
radar data indicated that wreckages followed the flightpath
and spread along the downwind side. Before the cockpit voice
recorder stopped recording, flight crews were discussing a
“cabin smoke problem.” Therefore, wreckage reconstruction
of SR111 emphasized finding the source of spark and smoke;
reconstruction sections were then focused on the fuselage,
flight deck, and electrical wiring. In contrast to past aircraft
wreckage hardware reconstruction, the TSB of Canada was
the first to produce panoramic images of the flight deck, which
provide wreckage inspection technology similar to “virtual re-
ality.” In conjunction with wreckage sketches, 3-D CAD mod-
els, and relevant power wiring diagrams, TSB was able to dem-
onstrate evidence of wire burning during the breakup se-
quence. The 3-D CAD model used to establish SR111 wreckage
reconstruction is an improved method from the traditional
hardware reconstruction.
Table 2: Comparison of Long-Range and Precision 3-D Laser Scanners.
Table 1: Aircraft Wreckage Reconstruction for Inflight Breakup Investigations in
Recent 15 Years.
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From the experience of using the 3-D CAD model devel-
oped by TSB in SR111 investigation, the ASC went on to de-
velop the 3-D Software Wreckage Reconstruction and Presen-
tation System (3D-SWRPS).
Architectures of 3D-SWRPS
The 3D-SWRPS utilizes a combination of computer 3-D-
graphic techniques, laser scanning of wreckages recovered,
the structure frame of an identical B-747-200 aircraft, and a
generic CATIA engineering model of the same type of air-
organized point clouds, as produced by most plane-of-light
laser scanner and optical systems.
• Aligning multiple datasets: During the digitizing process,
investigators need either to rotate the wreckage or move the 3-
D laser scanner in order to measure all wreckage surfaces. As a
result, the digitizing process produced several 3-D scans ex-
pressed in a different 3-dimensional coordinate system. This
step consists of bringing these scans into the same coordinate.
• Merging multiple datasets: A 3-D-graphic virtual reconstruc-
tion allows investigators to automatically merge a set of aligned
3-D scans of wreckage into a reference model, which was ob-
tained from the same type of aircraft and Boeing’s CATIA
model. This procedure reduces the noise in the original 3-D
data by averaging overlapped measurements.
• Polygon editing and reduction: In order to control the
computer’s memory allocation, this step uses the polygon re-
duction tool to reduce the 3-D model’s size.
• Manually edit surfaces: Especially with uneven surfaces that
may cause data loss.
• Texture mapping: Investigators can create texture-mapped
models from the digitized color 3-D data.
• Breakup animation: A major function of this module is to
simulate the inflight breakup sequence by combining radar
data, ballistic trajectory, wind profile data, and wreckage 3-D
model data in time history.
The 3D-SWRPS consists of six stand-alone programs: bal-
listic trajectory, polywork, multigen creator, polytrans, ratio-
nal reduction, and the recovery analysis and presentation sys-
tem (RAPS). The U.S. NTSB developed the ballistic trajec-
tory program. The TSB of Canada developed RAPS. The
Investigation Laboratory of ASC Taiwan developed other pro-
grams and integrated the whole as 3D-SWRPS.
After all 161 pieces of wreckage were scanned and mod-
eled, ASC investigators spent 3 months to aligning and at-
taching 62 pieces onto the reference model, based upon their
frame station and stringer number of the original aircraft.
The result gives the investigators the capability to interact with
the 3D-SWRPS to view the inner and outer side of the fuse-
lage in different angles, to further examine the fracture con-
ditions of neighboring wreckage pieces, metal fatigue and
stress propagation of structures. In addition, the 3-D wreck-
age model also links to the database of the Systems Group,
where investigators could access wreckage attributes through
a secured Intranet. These attributes include size, station, sec-
tion, damage photos, 3-D model, etc.
Results and discussion
Cargo aircraft 3-D model—The reference model of a B-747-200
cargo aircraft includes nose, fuselage, horizontal and vertical
tails, inner frame, duct, aft pressure bulkhead, and door
frames. During a D-check of the cargo aircraft, the heat insu-
lation blanket was removed. The ASC spent 30 hours scan-
ning the inner portion of the model.
CI611 wreckage 3-D model—Scanning and modeling 161 pieces
of wreckage took 2 months. Each piece requires three to eight
scans depending on its shape. The basic element of a 3-D
model is composed of polygons. According to the conditions
of the crooked and fractured wreckage, each 3-D model con-
sists of polygons ranging from 30 to 70,000 in numbers, and
craft. It provides sub-centimeter accuracy in the reconstruc-
tion process. It can also be used to determine fracture behav-
ior and propagation of stress of the breakup. In addition, the
3D-SWRPS can combine radar return signal, wreckage sal-
vage data, and ballistic simulation program to assist analyz-
ing the breakup sequence.
The 3D-SWRPS project uses a long-range and precise 3-D
laser scanner. Table 2 (page 13) summarizes the functions of
3-D laser scanners OPTECH (model ILRIS) and RIEGL
(model LMS Z420). Based on the reliable operational safety
of a laser, it can achieve precision to 3 mm with maximum
range of 2 km. In order to align the 3-D wreckage model onto
the “reference model,” two models were collected, a Boeing
747-200 CATIA model and a scanned model of a China Air-
lines B-747-200 cargo aircraft. The ASC selected the ILRIS to
do the job. The 3-D scanning was done to the whole aircraft’s
inner and outer body.
Sections 44, 46, and 48 of the CI611 wreckage were 3-D
scanned and modeled at Hangar II of Tao Yuan Air Force
Base (TAFB), Taiwan. In total, 161 pieces of wreckage were
digitized and modeled into 3D-SWRPS; among them, 50
wreckage pieces needed crane handling to be scanned. Wreck-
ages less than 1 m in size or smaller cargo floor beam pieces
were ignored. The 3-D scanning and modeling process took
nearly 1 month.
3D-SWRPS represents a different processing method for
the aircraft wreckage reconstruction as follows:
• 3-D object digitizing: Once each individual piece is scanned
by the laser scanner, the piece is then digitized. It processes
3D-SWRPS can provide sub-centimeter
accuracy scan quality, and can be used
to determine fracture behavior and air-
craft breakup propagation. Advantages
of the 3D-SWRPS are a) no wreckage
disposal problem; b) reusability, once
developed, the methodology can be used
for other accident investigation; c) only
one-half of the cost as compared to
hardware reconstruction; d) flexibility
in combining with simulation program
for better analysis support.
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from 3 MB to 120 MB in file size. The data processing plat-
form is a PC-based hi-level graphics workstation, equipped
with a 1024 MB memory, AGP 4x graphics card, and 80 GB
hard drive.
Figure 1 illustrates the crane operation and side view of
item 2136. The reference number of stations and stringers
are between 1960 and 2100, and between S-07L and S-11R,
respectively.
The entire 3-D wreckage model is aligned with reference
coordinates of stations and stringers. Wreckages with the least-
deformed fracture surfaces were selected first as the reference
point of alignment and aligning surfaces. The greatest diffi-
culty in 3-D software reconstruction is the computer’s memory
allocation and the appropriate selection of reference point of
alignment. An uneven selection of the reference point of align-
ment could cause gaps in the connecting surfaces of wreck-
ages, or the alignment could not be done.
By using the reference coordinates of item 640, when manu-
ally aligning this piece onto the reference model of a B-747-
200, it shows that the item belongs to section 46 of the right
aft fuselage structure. Figure 2 indicates that the severe dam-
age of the outer blend is located at stations 2060 and 2180,
and a large “V”-shaped fracture existed at station 2180. Fig-
ure 2 also shows the inner view of item 640; the aft cargo-door
frame is slightly deformed but intact with relevant frames of
the fuselage. Figure 2 also illustrates significant fracture con-
ditions between stations 1920 and 1980.
Figure 3. Comparison of 2-D layout and 3-D software
reconstruction at section 46 and aft pressure bulkhead
(upside-down view from the right).
In fact, it is very useful to adopt the 3D-SWRPS to evaluate
or measure fracture behaviors. It could more easily measure
the arc distance, including curve angles on the surface of wreck-
ages, than to mark or compare the differences between the
wreckage and reference model.
Totally, 1,442 pieces of wreckage were salvaged from the
Taiwan Strait, which were then identified and placed at the
Air Force base hangar for hardware reconstruction. After final
tagging, sketching, and initial examination, all wreckages were
arranged on the hangar floor according to their respective
fuselage station and stringer numbers. Up to this point, there
are 62 pieces of wreckage aligned on the reference CATIA
model. Figure 3 shows the 2-D layout and 3-D software recon-
struction at section 46 and the aft pressure bulkhead view from
the outer right side.
A comparison
The use of 3D-SWRPS is generally better than 3-D hardware
reconstruction. In fact, manpower, budget, and space required
for 3D-SWRPS is much less than for 3-D hardware reconstruc-
tion. 3D-SWRPS has great advantages in reusability, ballistic
trajectory analysis and simulation, and in conjunction with
finite element analysis.
The cost of 3-D hardware reconstruction for CI611 was
US$143,000, only for section 46. The cost of 3D-SWRPS for
CI611 was US$91,500, including crane operation, rental of a
3-D scanner, and labor cost of two engineers. Use of 2-D wreck-
age layout together with 3-D software reconstruction might
be the best choice if 3-D hardware reconstruction is not really
that necessary from the investigation point of view.
3D-SWRPS can provide sub-centimeter accuracy scan qual-
ity, and can be used to determine fracture behavior and air-
craft breakup propagation. Advantages of the 3D-SWRPS are
a) no wreckage disposal problem; b) reusability, once devel-
oped, the methodology can be used for other accident inves-
tigation; c) only one-half of the cost as compared to hardware
reconstruction; d) flexibility in combining with simulation pro-
gram for better analysis support. u
Figure 1. Crane operation photo of item 2136 and side
view of 3-D model.
Figure 2. 3-D model of item 640 and reference frame model.
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(This article was adapted, with permission, from the author’s presenta-
tion entitled “Crashworthiness Investigation: Enhanced Occupant Pro-
tection Through Crashworthiness Evaluation and Advances in Design—
A View from the Wreckage,” presented at the ISASI 2003 seminar in
Washington, D.C., USA, August 2003. The full presentation is avail-
able on the ISASI website at http://www.isasi.org.—Editor)Crashworthiness” is the technology and means by whichwe mitigate the effects of accidents. Nothing we do incrashworthiness will ever prevent an accident, only
change the outcome. For some folks (including investigators),
this requires a fundamental paradigm shift. Much of what we
do in safety and accident investigation is focused on stopping
the accident. To do crashworthiness, we must assume that we
will have accidents. Only then can we learn and accomplish
the things necessary to protect the occupants of aircraft in
accidents we cannot stop.
A proper definition of accident survivability gives us back-
ground and a starting point. A survivable accident is one in
which the impact forces that reach the occupants remain within hu-
man tolerance, and occupiable space is maintained through the im-
pact sequence, and the environment remains livable throughout the
impact and beyond. All three situations must exist for survival to
be accomplished.
Accident investigation is like the discipline of history in many
respects. We start from today and work backwards through
time, gathering the data, evidence, and information neces-
sary to understand how we got to where we are. There are
some people who believe that crashworthiness is a somewhat
new approach. In reality, we are building on the work of those
who came before. I could spend hours telling you about folks
like Dr. Jerry Snyder, Harry Robertson, Doc Turnbow, Vic
Rothe, Chuck Miller, Richard Chandler, and many others.
Many survivors of crashes owe their very lives to those folks.
In the field of crashworthiness investigation, two people stand
out, for they started it all. Hugh DeHaven is literally the “fa-
ther” of crashworthiness. Like so many folks in aviation safety,
he started with a plane crash—his own. In 1916, while training
to be a Royal Canadian Flying Corps pilot, he was involved in a
mid-air collision in which everyone but him was killed. He was
seriously injured in the crash and spent 6 months in the hospi-
tal. After that, since he couldn’t fly anymore, he was assigned to
investigate plane crashes. He was intrigued by several crashes
in which the airplane was relatively intact, but in which the oc-
cupants were killed or seriously injured. This put him on the
road to the study of injurious mechanisms. He was a graduate of
the “first” formal training course for aircraft accident investiga-
tors, his certificate signed by Jerry Lederer himself. Through
his work at Cornell, AvCIR, and beyond, he founded the belief
system that we use today. His “packaging principles,” first pub-
lished in 1950, provide the basis for any crashworthy design.
They are
• “The package should not open up and spill its contents
and should not collapse under expected conditions of force
and thereby expose objects inside it to damage.”
• “The packaging structures which shield the inner container
must not be made of frail or brittle materials; they should
resist force by yielding and absorbing energy applied to the
outer container so as to cushion and distribute impact forces
and thereby protect objects inside the inner container.”
• “Articles contained in the package should be held and im-
mobilized inside the outer structure by what packaging engi-
neers call interior packaging. This interior packaging is an ex-
tremely important part of the overall design, for it prevents
movement and resultant damage from impact against the in-
side of the package itself.”
• “The means for holding an object inside a shipping con-
tainer must transmit the forces applied to the container to the
strongest parts of the contained objects.”
If we assume that the “container” is an aircraft fuselage,
and the “interior packaging” is the restraint system and
tiedown chain, then we have an excellent perspective on im-
pact crashworthiness, and can understand how to design sys-
tems to minimize injury.
DeHaven’s assistant at Cornell was A. Howard Hasbrook.
Like DeHaven, Hasbrook survived a near-fatal plane crash
while crop-dusting in 1946. As Administrator of Field Research
at the Crash Injury Research center, Hasbrook became con-
vinced that investigation into “survivability factors” would al-
low changes in design and construction of aircraft to reduce
the likelihood of injury or fatality.
In 1951, the Cornell University Medical College published
the first guide (written by Hasbrook) for accident investigators
to use in gathering the types of information necessary to do a
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crashworthiness evaluation of an aircraft accident. It specified
procedures to use at an accident scene to preserve survivability
aspects and identified the types of data necessary to the crash-
worthiness investigator. Most of it is as pertinent today as it was
then. It identified the three basic pieces of evidence that must
be gathered: angles, velocities, and distances—measurements
that are often lacking in accident reports today. It also provided
guidance to correlate the physical evidence gathered at the scene
with injury patterns determined by autopsy or medical exami-
nation of survivors. Hasbrook conducted the first “crashwor-
thiness” investigation on an airline plane crash in August 1952
of a Northeast Airlines Convair 240 accident at La Guardia. In
1954, DeHaven “retired” from the Aviation CIR program, and
Howard Hasbrook became the Director.
Hasbrook’s lifelong devotion to crash survival investigation
continued through his tenure at AvCIR and later the FAA Aero-
medical Branch. During his career, he wrote many articles and
reports, mostly focused on how to improve survival in plane
crashes. Though he was already at the FAA, Howard provided
technical advice during creation of the first “crash survival
investigator’s school” through AvCIR in Phoenix. He remained
an active pilot virtually till the end of his life, remembered as a
spur pushing the need for survival investigation.
Applying the lessons
In 1950, Fred Weick designed the AG-1 at Texas A & M. This
was a crop-duster incorporating recommendations made by
DeHaven and Hasbrook. The concept involved positioning
the cockpit above and behind much of the mass in the air-
plane, with that structure being designed to progressively de-
form in a crash, thereby absorbing energy and attenuating
the g-loads that reached the cockpit. It had a tri-axial steel
roll cage around the pilot and tied him into the seat with a
five-point harness that locked automatically using inertia reels.
It was designed to provide a “40-g island of safety” for the
pilot. The AG-1 evolved into the Piper Pawnee. Crop-dusters
today still incorporate much of this technology (refined a bit)
to protect the pilot in a crash. ASI’s who have investigated AG
accidents find that pilots in these crashes experience a much
lower injury and fatality rate than those involved in accidents
with other types of aircraft.
In the general aviation world, Beechcraft was the first manu-
facturer to use “crashworthiness” in design of its aircraft. The
1950s vintage Bonanzas and twin-Bonanzas had a long nose
section, a reinforced keel and cockpit area, a wing designed to
attenuate energy in a crash, seats that were attached with bolts
to the spar trusses with belts attached to the seats, and a break-
away instrument panel and yoke designed to reduce head and
upper body trauma. The company even incorporated shoul-
der harnesses in some models (not required in the rest of the
GA fleet until those aircraft manufactured after 1978).
To a crashworthiness investigator, these ideas seem like mom
and apple pie. Beechcraft began a public relations campaign to
“sell” safety, based on DeHaven’s and Hasbrook’s work at CIR.
The details are spelled out in a report authored by DeHaven in
1953, “Development of Crash-Survival Design in Personal,
Executive, and Agricultural Aircraft.” The folks at Beech were
ahead of their time. Crashworthiness was a marketing flop. GA
aircraft owners didn’t want to pay for the extra systems in their
aircraft. Aircraft should be made to fly, not to crash. They might
even be trapped in a burning airplane by the shoulder har-
nesses. By 1960, Beechcraft abandoned its crashworthiness ef-
forts and went back to building “standard” airplanes.
In 1959, the Cornell-Guggenheim Foundation became af-
filiated with the Flight Safety Foundation, and Flight Safety
Foundation took over administration of what was now AvCIR
(Aviation Crash Injury Research) in Phoenix, Ariz. The main
focus of the program was now to develop and carry out test
crashes using real aircraft to gather data on what actually hap-
pens in a crash. In a joint effort with NASA, the U.S. Army, and
the FAA, 43 tests were completed, including the famous DC-7
and L1649 Connie crashes. Experiments gathered data on ki-
nematic and impact-related issues, seat and restraint systems,
fuel containment, and fire. Many of the pioneers of aviation
safety were affiliated with the program over the years, includ-
ing Jerry Lederer, C.O. Miller, Doc Turnbow, Harry Robertson,
John Carroll, Joe Haley, Stan Desjardins, and, of course, Howard
Hasbrook. Doc Turnbow and John Carroll started the first crash
investigator’s school (now the International Center for Safety
Education run by SIMULA), and Doc continues to dazzle stu-
dents with kinematic evaluation and application.
On the federal side of the house, Dr. Stan Mohler and Dr.
John Swearingen ran the Civil Aeromedical Research Insti-
tute (CARI), which later became CAMI. They brought
Hasbrook over to the FAA in 1959 and began investigating
crashes to understand how people were injured or killed. In
1960, Dr. Jerry Snyder joined CARI and became chief of the
Physical Anthropology Lab and the Protection and Survival
Lab at Oklahoma City.
Dr. Snyder’s many articles and reports are another excel-
lent source of survivability information. In 1966, the name
was changed to the Civil AeroMedical Institute (CAMI), and
over the years the programs and research have continued to
provide data and guidance relating to survivability and crash-
worthiness. Several facilities have provided critical crashwor-
thiness data over the years. The FAA Technical Center in At-
lantic City continues to research impact and fire survivability
issues.
Airline crashworthiness investigation
Since Hasbrook first investigated an airline accident from the
crashworthiness perspective in 1952, we’ve come a long way.
Particularly over the last 25 years or so, “survival investiga-
tion” is an essential part of any “major” investigation. The
NTSB has gotten very good at investigating crashworthiness
AG-1 concept.
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issues in major airline crashes. The FAA has been gradually
applying the lessons learned from these investigations and
has improved the survivability of modern airline aircraft. Three
examples are case in point:
The first involves Air Canada Flight 797, which experienced
an inflight fire in 1983. The aircraft made an emergency land-
ing at Cincinnati after 18 minutes, with the smoke and toxic
gasses building up through the entire descent. Twenty-three
of the 46 people on board died. Among the survival issues
examined were the early stages of the fire in the lavatory dur-
ing which it was not detected. As a direct result of this acci-
dent, the FAA mandated that smoke detectors be installed in
airline lavatories. Another issue was the rapid involvement of
the cabin furnishings and how significantly they contributed
to the smoke and toxic gas build-up. The focus remained on
the various plastics in airline cabins for the next few years.
Ironically, the fire had not originated from someone throwing
a lit cigarette into the trash bin, but was electric in origin. To
this day, some folks still believe that it started with a cigarette.
The second accident happened in Manchester, England, in
1985. During the takeoff run, a combustor can exploded on
the left engine of the 737, through a section of the can through
the shroud and into the underside of the wing. It hit a cast
aluminum inspection plate and shattered a 6-inch hole in the
wing, resulting in a massive fuel leak. Due to somewhat un-
usual circumstances, the fire burned much hotter than Jet A
normally does, resulting in a burnthrough and penetration of
the aircraft sidewall skin in about 20 seconds. The cabin fur-
nishings became involved very quickly and generated a tre-
mendous amount of toxic gasses. Combined with major com-
promises to the evacuation, 55 people lost their lives, even
though the crash/fire/rescue efforts and actions of the crew
were magnificent. This accident caught quite a bit of atten-
tion and, in combination with the Air Canada accident and
efforts of the FAA Tech Center, resulted in major changes to
materials used in airline cabins. Experiments began to focus
on fire suppression as well, including use of cabin water spray
systems. Dr. Helen Muir and others in Britain began to ex-
periment with smoke hoods and changes in seating configu-
rations. The CFR community experimented with ways to in-
troduce foams into a burning airliner cabin, culminating in
the Snozzle device in use today.
The last example is the Continental DC-10 accident at LAX
in 1978. The aircraft blew tires on the left main landing gear
at V1 and the crew rejected the takeoff. The aircraft overranthe end of the runway and the left main gear collapsed. When
the tires failed, they threw fragments into the underside of
the left wing, opening several holes in that fuel tank. When
the aircraft stopped, the pooling fuel ran toward the fuselage
and ignited. The fire was concentrated mostly on the left side
of the aircraft and center fuselage. Most of the emergency
exits were unusable due to the fire. The two right forward
exits deployed properly, but the slides were painted orange-
yellow for visibility if used as life rafts. Fire never touched the
forward slide, but due to the radiant heat uptake, the slide
burst. Several passengers and a flight attendant had to exit
through the copilot’s side window. Some were injured by the
rope or dropping the 8 feet or so after they were outside. A
major change here was the requirement that slides be covered
with a reflective outer layer, to reduce the radiant heat suscep-
tibility and allow the slide to remain functional longer during
an evacuation.
These examples focus mainly on fire crashworthiness. Harry
Robertson is perhaps the premiere fire safety investigator in
the world. His designs for improving fire survivability are in
use on military aircraft around the world today. They are even
used in Indie cars to reduce the likelihood of fuel spill in a
racecar crash. A current research project is under way to bet-
ter understand how to minimize the possibility of fuel release
in a crash and therefore reduce the likelihood of impact or
post-impact fire. In the airline world, fire and its by-products
pose the greatest threat to occupants during a crash, yet fire is
involved in relatively few crashes.
Over the years, many improvements have been made in im-
pact survivability as well. The seat/restraint systems are a major
focus in airline crashes. The old standards for certification were
grossly inadequate, requiring only that a passenger seat with-
stand 9 g’s horizontally, 4.5 vertically, and 1.5 laterally. These
seats were only required to be tested statically. Over the years,
after many investigations in which passengers were injured or
killed because seats failed or pulled out of the floor tracks,
changes were made to require 16 g’s horizontally, and be tested
dynamically. We’ve gotten better, though we still have a ways to
go. One problem remains involving old aircraft. Installing a
16-g seat in a 9-g track and floor just changes the weak point
and moves where it fails. Plus, thanks to Col. Stapp and others,
we know that a properly restrained human can withstand much
higher g-loads in a crash than the seats. A focus for the future.
General aviation crashworthiness
In the report, “Survivability of Accidents Involving Part 121
U.S. Air Carrier Operations, 1983 Through 2000,” the NTSB
points out one of the recurring problems with analysis of gen-
eral aviation crash survivability. It states, “The Safety Board
examined only air carrier operations performed under … Part
121 because the majority of the Board’s survival factors inves-
tigations are conducted in connection with accidents involv-
ing Part 121 carriers. Therefore, more survivability data are
available for Part 121 operations than are available for Part
135 and Part 91 (general aviation) operations.” Looking at a
10-year average, GA still experiences about 2,000 accidents
per year. In about 25 percent of these, serious injuries and/or
Left, S-tube seat. Right, pre-1988 general aviation seat.
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fatalities occur. In most cases, there is little to no data relative
to the specific injuries themselves or what may have caused
the injuries. Without good data, it is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to determine what hurts people, nor make changes to
prevent injuries in the future. Two case examples illustrate
the points, as well as examine the issues with crashworthiness.
The first of these accidents happened in 1989. The aircraft
was a Cessna 172N, built in 1977, being flown by a 120-hour
private pilot. The flight was intended to show the pilot’s girl-
friend (passenger) what aviation was all about. The pilot had
not flown in 63 days and had had problems with landings. On
his first touch-and-go attempt, the pilot was rushed, round-
ing the base to final turn and touching down at a high vertical
velocity. The aircraft bounced off and flew horizontally down
the runway about a wingspan above the surface. Witnesses
indicated that the flaps appeared down (40 deg) at the initial
contact, then retracted near the mid point of the runway. The
aircraft then nosed over and hit the runway. It slid out in the
infield area, hit a taxiway sign, and flipped to the left, with the
landing gear all failed. The pilot experienced multiple dis-
placed fractures of his lumbar vertebrae and is permanently
paralyzed from the waist down. The passenger suffered fac-
tures of the thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, but at a lesser
severity and without displacement.
Examination of the wreckage revealed why the injuries were
differing in severity. During impact, the nose gear failed rear-
ward and positioned under the pilot’s seat area. This caused a
reduction in collapsible space (stopping distance) of about 6
inches. It also projected upward and bent his inboard seat rail
up through the leading edge. This caused about a 15-deg
lateralization to the left and a 50 percent increase in the g-
loads he experienced, as compared to the passenger. Further,
the brittle nature of the seat frame undoubtedly increased the
g-spike that both occupants experienced. The result was the
injury patterns experienced by the two occupants. Without
the basic data (distances, angles, and velocities), it would have
been difficult to understand why the injury patterns were what
they were. The investigation also revealed the inherent lack of
crashworthiness of most older GA aircraft.
The second accident is a good illustration of how important
crashworthiness investigation can be. It involved a new Cessna
172S, which was designed according to the modified Part 23
requirements specifying 22-g seats and dynamic testing.
The aircraft had two occupants, an instructor and a student.
They were attempting a touch-and-go landing when the air-
craft encountered a severe lateral wind gust or microburst. The
right wing came up suddenly and violently, rolling them over
to the left. The instructor’s attempt to correct was unsuccessful
and the aircraft cartwheeled to the left off the runway. The left
wing failed at the root, and the fuselage broke apart at the aft
cabin bulkhead frame. The aircraft came to rest inverted. The
IP extracted the unconscious student and both were medevaced
to the hospital. The student had suffered serious injuries as a
result of the left wing root intruding into the cabin area and his
head striking the structure. The instructor had minor injuries
only. Examination of the wreckage showed that the restraint
systems performed normally. Even though this was a severe
impact sequence, both occupants survived. Contrasting the
damage to the aircraft with the previous case example, the new
S-model experienced a much more severe impact, with a much
more complex impact situation than the older aircraft. Yet the
injuries to the occupants of the new aircraft were much less.
Seat/restraint issues
The older GA seats had little built-in crashworthiness. They
were made of rigid, brittle materials and tended to fail in ways
that increased injury severity. Further, the seat belt anchor-
ages were attached to the floor, rather than to the seat. The
ideal pull-off angle across the pelvis is 45 degrees. That angle
can only be achieved if the belt anchorage is attached to the
seat frame itself. The newer 22-g GA seats incorporate this
feature as well as other changes, which were all learned through
crashworthiness investigation. For example, in older aircraft
the anchorages attached to the floor result in a change to the
belt pull-off angle if the seat is positioned anywhere other
than to accommodate a 50th percentile male mesomorph (5’9”
tall with average arm leg torso proportions). When a tall per-
son moves the seat all the way back, it results in an acute ver-
tical lap belt pull-off angle. In a crash, this can dislocate the
hips or break the femurs. A short person moves the seat all
the way forward, resulting in a shallow pull-off angle, which
may actually be positioned over the lower abdomen. In a crash,
this person ruptures the spleen or intestines.
There are several seat systems that are intentionally designed
to attenuate energy in a crash. The SIMULA Corporation manu-
factures several energy-attenuating seats for use in a variety of
military aircraft. The S-tube seat was originally designed in the
70s for use in some general aviation aircraft. The retro-fit can
be accomplished in the Cessna 182 and C206 models, and has
been incorporated in the Mission Aviation fellowship aircraft
for years. This particular seat was installed in a C206 that crashed
in South America a few years ago. All the occupants survived an
extreme crash, with minimal injury. It is one further example
of how applying the lessons learned through crashworthiness
investigation can be applied to change aircraft designs and sys-
tems to improve survivability.
What the crashworthiness engineer needs from the field
investigator is the right data necessary to do a crashworthiness
evaluation. For fire crashworthiness, we need evidence of fuel
release points, fire origin and propagation, ignition sources,
and fire effects. For impact analysis, we need angles…impact
angles, attitude at impact, etc., velocities, impact airspeed,
deceleration once on the surface, and a good description of
the entire impact sequence and how non-linear decelerations
might have happened. We also need distances. The vertical
and horizontal ground scar measurements, as well as vertical
and horizontal crush distances in front of and below the occu-
pants. We also need good descriptions of deformations to the
aircraft (photos work wonders) as they relate to the surround-
ing terrain. We also need good medical and pathologic infor-
mation as to injuries and injury mechanisms as they relate to
the victims. The old days of finding cause of death listed on
the autopsy report as “airplane crash” just don’t allow us to
understand why the people got hurt or killed.
If we are truly going to improve survivability, crashworthi-
ness investigation can provide the best data available to make
those changes necessary. We can change the future, by learn-
ing from the past! u
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(This article was adapted, with permission, from the author’s presen-
tation entitled “CVR Recordings of Explosions and Structural Fail-
ure Decompressions,” presented at the ISASI 2003 Seminar in Wash-
ington, D.C., USA, August 2003. The full presentation is available
on the ISASI website at http://www.isasi.org.—Editor)Rapid identification of the cause of failure is a high pri-ority in the immediate aftermath of a major civil aircraft accident. Attention is often focused on the two
recorders, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data
recorder. In the event of sudden, catastrophic loss of an air-
craft through explosions or structural failure decompressions,
the recordings are seen as even more important. Yet these
recorders are not designed to record such events with great
fidelity, and the ability of accident investigators to interpret
such recordings has been severely tested in several major acci-
dents in the past 30 years. Comparisons between accident re-
cordings have not been able to produce conclusive results.
The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch report on the
Pan Am Lockerbie accident in December 1998 identified a
loud sound lasting 170 ms on the cockpit area microphone
(CAM) track at the end of the recording. The sound occurred
while the crew was copying their transatlantic clearance from
Shanwick ATC. A very large volume of forensic material aris-
ing out of Lockerbie indicated that detonation of an impro-
vised explosive device led directly to the destruction of the
aircraft. While it is reasonably inferred that the “loud sound”
is related in some way to the detonation of the explosive de-
vice, the official report into the accident conceded “analysis
of the flight recorders…did not reveal positive evidence of
the explosion event.”
Moreover a safety recommendation arising out of the in-
vestigation was that “a method should be devised of record-
ing positive and negative pressure pulses, preferably utilizing
the aircraft’s flight recorder systems.” Since the publication of
this report, a study into the CVR/CAM response to explosions
and structural failure rapid decompressions has taken place
and has been reported widely to working groups, such as ISASI
WG50, EUROCAE ED-56, at conferences in 1993 and 1995,
and to the ISASI seminar in 1995. More recently a loud sound
at the end of the TWA 800 recording was subject to detailed
and meticulous analysis by the NTSB but did not reveal the
cause of the accident and was therefore of little diagnostic
value. This aim of this paper is to explain why these record-
ings do not lead to useful forensic evidence and to consider
what systems would be necessary to discriminate between ex-
plosions and structural failure decompressions and to locate
the seat of the hull loss.
CAM/CVR recordings of explosions
Figure 1 shows the CVR and instrumentation signatures for
an explosion event conducted on the ground in an ex-service
BAe Trident aircraft. The plot shows the CAM channel of each
of three tape-based CVR systems together with an accelerom-
eter (vibration sensor) and a microphone (pressure sensor)
installed close to the CAM for the trials. All sensors were in
close proximity to each other in the cockpit and the explosion
was approximately 9.4 m aft of the sensor position. Time zero
is the time of detonation of the explosive device—obviously
this reference would not be available on an accident record-
ing but is helpful here in the determination of the cause of
events within the recording.
Several features are striking about this Figure 1. First, the
three CAM signatures have some similar features but are cer-
tainly not identical. The features that they share include a
response commencing before 0.01s with a low amplitude and
low frequency range (the graph is fairly smooth). All of them
change character at around 0.025s increasing in amplitude
About the author: Stuart Dyne is Manager of
ISVR Consulting, the consultancy division of the
Institute of Sound and Vibration Research at the
University of Southampton in the UK. He has a
B.A. in engineering science from the University of
Oxford and works in acoustics, shock and vibra-
tion, and signal processing. In addition to his
ISASI membership, he is a member of the Royal Aeronautical
Society, Fellow of the Institute of Acoustics, and a chartered
engineer. Author comment: This article has used data from a
variety of trials. We gratefully acknowledge the support of DSTL
(formerly DERA), the Department of Transport (particularly the
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Weakness ofCVR Recordings
Learn why cockpit voice recorder (CVR)
recordings are generally unable to dis-
criminate between explosions and struc-
tural failure decompressions.
By Stuart Dyne (MO4779), Institute of Sound and
Vibration Research, University of Southampton, UK
January-March 2004 ISASI Forum • 21
and frequency range (the graph becomes more spiky). Inter-
estingly, the vibration record is similar although the vibration
response amplitude falls soon after 0.035s whereas the record
for CVR system 1 remains at a high level until 0.06s and high
for the whole of the record for CVR 2, suggesting a possible
saturation of the tape dynamic range. The pressure record
differs from the others in that it only commences at 0.025s.
Similar results have been obtained from very many trials with
explosive devices at many locations on several aircraft, and the
following explanation of the records described above may be
inferred. First the blast wave from the explosion source impinges
on the structure and a shock wave is then transmitted through
the structure at a speed of 4,000 to 5,000 m/s. The CAM is
sensitive to vibration and responds to the arrival of the struc-
ture-borne shock wave. Meanwhile the air-blast wave travels
through the fuselage and eventually arrives in the cockpit. The
speed of this wave is dependent upon the yield of the explosion
but can be taken as the speed of sound in air of 340 m/s where
distances are relatively large and yields are quite small. On ar-
rival in the cockpit, the blast produces both a pressure response
from the CAM and produces further local vibration (as seen by
the accelerometer) to which the CAM is also sensitive. The in-
strumentation microphone (bottom graph of Figure 1) responds
only when the pressure wave arrives at the CAM and is de-
signed to have very low vibration sensitivity.
Vibration sensitivity
Interestingly, the CAM is quite sensitive to vibration. This
phenomenon has been exploited in the past with helicopter
gearbox investigations, yet the CAM is intentionally vibration
isolated from the structure. The reason is simply that the vi-
bration levels of a few g’s are themselves quite high, not that
the CAM or vibration isolation is poorly designed.
The results of all these trials appeared to show that locating
the seat of an explosion event should be rather straightfor-
ward. One simply took the difference in arrival times of the
structure-borne and airborne shock waves and computed dis-
tance from this difference using values for the two propaga-
tion velocities. Formulae for this were given in my paper Analysis
of CVR Transient Signatures and take into account the possible
delay caused by the propagation of an air-blast wave across
the fuselage for a device not attached to the outer skin, so
providing lower and upper bounds for the distance from the
cockpit to the seat of the explosion.
However, accident recordings did not appear to show these
two events with any distinction, so determination of axial lo-
cation using direct application of this method was not pos-
sible. Moreover some trials with larger explosion yields also
did not show the two events; the explosion response simply
arrived and then decayed with time without distinct change
in bandwidth or amplitude after the start. Analysis of the in-
fluence of explosion yield on the response components helps
to explain why this is so.
Explosion yield
Trials were conducted on a Boeing 747 aircraft using small-
yield explosions. The response was measured with five widely
used commercial aircraft CVR systems including four tape-based
Figure 1: CVR and instrumentation signatures for an
explosive device.
Figure 2: Variation in CVR output with explosion yield for
t1<t<t2 for five different CVR/CAM systems. Each symbol
represents one CVR type.
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systems and one solid-state recorder. For one series of firings,
the same-source location was used each time but the mass of
explosive was increased linearly from one unit to five units. The
results, sets of time series, resembled the time series given in
Figure 1 so are not reproduced here. Instead, in Figure 2, peak-
to-peak values for the two components in each of the record-
ings are shown. Suppose we denote the time of arrival of the
structure borne wave by t1 and the time of arrival of the air-
borne wave by t2. Figure 2 shows the CVR/CAM response am-
plitude for t1<t<t2, i.e., the response due exclusively to the
structure-borne shock. The figure shows that an increase in yield
generally produces a greater CVR/CAM output.
Figure 3 shows the results for t>t2, i.e., the response after
the arrival of the airborne blast wave including both sound
and vibration. Observe that the amplitude of this response is
not only greater than for the phase t1<t<t2 but is indepen-
dent of the explosion yield. This implies that the physical
parameter variation is greater than the dynamic range of the
recorder or that the sensors are overloaded and that the re-
cording is saturated and probably highly distorted.
Figure 4 shows a CAM time history for a high-yield explo-
sion on a pressurized Boeing 727 aircraft. The charge was
approximately 8.1 m aft of the cockpit; the explosion rup-
tured the skin of the aircraft. Clearly the CAM does not show
a transition at t2. The time taken for sound to travel from the
seat of the explosion to the cockpit is approximately 0.024s,
and the response clearly begins significantly before this. We
infer that the response begins ostensibly at t1 but the magni-
tude already exceeds the dynamic range of the CAM/CVR so
no change in signal magnitude is visible at t2. The record is
therefore unable to show the axial location of the charge as
was the case for smaller, non-destructive tests.
The yields of all the explosions analyzed in Figures 2 and 3
are below the yield that might be expected from a terrorist
device. If results from increased yield were produced, the re-
sponse for t1<t<t2 for all recorder types would exceed the
dynamic range and the recordings would be saturated as was
the case in Figure 4. There would then be no discrimination
between the two phases of the response recording and the
section for t>t2 would be indistinguishable from t<t2. It is,
therefore, not possible to use the method described above to
locate the source for accident recordings.
One extensive study by F.W. Slingerland has attempted to
locate the seat of an explosion using the spectrogram of the
CVR recording. The basis of the method is that the structural
shock transmission is dispersive, i.e., different frequencies
propagate at different velocities. However, the nature of the
explosion source and complex multiple transmission paths
severely limit the applicability of the theoretical basis. Opera-
tionally, the method required placement of a series of curves
on an accident recording spectrogram with the intention that
their curvature would indicate distance from the source to the
CAM. Investigators found this aspect particularly problem-
atic as several sets of curves could be drawn on any given spec-
trogram leading to ambiguous results.
Figure 4: CAM time history for a high-yield explosion on a
Boeing 727 aircraft.
Figure 5: Recordings from pressure transducers placed on
either side of an explosion in a pressurized fuselage.
Figure 3: Variation in CVR output with explosion yield for
t>t2 for five different CVR/CAM systems.
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In one part of the study, spectrograms of several accidents
were analyzed in a blind test but were not able to confirm the
validity of the approach. A recommendation arising from a
review at the end of the study was that the method should not
be used in accident investigation (Wayne Jackson (ed.), CVR
Explosion Analysis Technique: Development and Evaluation, TP
13929E, Transport Canada, May 2002).
The interval t1<t<t2 is due to structure-borne vibration,
which is likely to be produced at very high levels under both
structural failure and explosion-generated conditions. In the
case of an explosion, t2 is the arrival time of the blast wave at
the CAM and in the case of a structural failure t2 is the arrival
of the decompression wave at the CAM. Decompression waves
travel at the speed of sound as with blast waves but are obvi-
ously of opposite polarity.
Their propagation velocity and arrival at the CAM has been
observed in various decompression trials. For both explosions
and decompressions, the CVR records are not high-fidelity re-
cordings of vibration as (i) the CAM is not designed as a vibra-
tion sensor but merely exhibits vibration sensitivity (which may
be frequency dependent, non-linear, and directionally depen-
dent) and (ii) because the limited dynamic range of the record-
ing medium and sensor are both (considerably) exceeded. Thus,
the CVR/CAM combination is unable to locate the source of a
decompression and seems to be unable to discriminate between
explosions and structural failure decompressions.
Pressure transducers
Among the instrumentation deployed in some trials were ar-
rays of pressure transducers. These are effectively very low
sensitivity microphones with corresponding low-vibration sen-
sitivity. Figure 5 shows the output of two transducers placed
on either side (axially) of an explosion in a pressurized fuse-
lage. Several features in these time histories are noteworthy.
First both records commence with a pressure rise. The magni-
tude of an air-blast pressure rise is a function of explosion
yield and distance from the charge and is widely tabulated by
G.F. Kinney and K.J. Graham in their 1962 paper Explosive
Shocks in Air, Springer-Verlag; and by the Department of the
Army’s Fundamentals of Protective Design for Conventional Weap-
ons, Technical Manual TM 5-855-1, 1986.
The pressure rises occur at different times because the trans-
ducers are at different distances from the explosion source. The
transducer closest to the charge shows the earliest and greatest
pressure rise. The time delay between the two pressure rises
can be used to determine the axial location of the device to
within 0.5 m. Secondly, both transducers show a pressure fall to
a value significantly below the original ambient conditions. This
is due to the breach of the pressurized fuselage. The rate of
depressurization indicates the size of the hole through which
cabin pressure is venting. The precise form of the pressure curve
(a series of pressure drops between short periods of relatively
constant pressure producing a step-like appearance) has been
explained by reference to one-dimensional flow models.
Interpretation of the results in Figure 5 indicates that re-
cordings of pressure from either side of an event appear to
offer everything the investigator would seek namely: the loca-
tion of the source (from the difference in arrival times), the
presence of any explosion (indicated by an initial pressure
rise), and any decompression (indicated by a pressure fall).
Although this single result suggests that pressure-transducer-
based systems may be widely applicable, trials are needed to
consider the effect of baggage in the immediate vicinity of the
explosive device, and of baggage and other barriers between
the source and sensors. While vibration has the advantage
that it is inevitably transmitted to all parts of the aircraft, it is
ostensibly more difficult to analyze vibration records to locate
sources. The likelihood of discriminating between explosions
and structural failure decompressions from vibration records
alone is not fully researched and certainly appears more diffi-
cult than the interpretation of pressure records.
Summary
We have seen that CVR/CAM records exhibit vibration sensi-
tivity and that vibration is transmitted from the seat of an
explosion/structural failure to the CAM. However, the level of
vibration produced in accidents is so high that the dynamic
range of the CAM/CVR is likely to be exceeded thereby mask-
ing the arrival of the explosion blast wave or decompression
rarefaction wave in the cockpit.
It is appropriate to review all CVR recordings (of established
provenance) of known explosions and structural failure de-
compressions. Such a review could confirm (or refute) the as-
sertion that no transition at candidate values of t2 is visible.
That is, the accident recordings correspond exclusively to vi-
bration and not to pressure/sound. If so, accident investiga-
tors should be relieved to learn that the inability to obtain
useful forensic information from the CVR in these cases is not
a failing on their part but simply an equipment limitation.
The industry needs to consider if explosion/structural fail-
ure decompression sensors are required. If so, there is a need
to invest in research to determine the most suitable sensor(s)
and appropriate means of recording, possibly exploiting the
flexibility now available through solid-state recording media.
Preliminary research suggests that pressure-based systems
may be ideal in sudden catastrophic loss incidents, but trials
are needed to consider the effect of baggage and other barri-
ers between the source and sensor(s). u
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(Adapted from minutes and notes of the
International Council meeting recorded by
Keith Hagy, Secretary.—Editor)The ISASI International Councilon Aug. 24, 2003, in a generalmeeting that preceded the ISASI
2003 seminar in Washington, D.C.,
adopted a near balanced budget for year
2004, adopted a proposal for a new web
communications policy for management
of the ISASI website, and adopted strin-
gent new Policies and Procedures gov-
erning the production and operation of
the annual seminar, among other mat-
ters, including adoption of two new Po-
sitions dealing with unlawful interference
and family assistance.
Following the “Call to Order” by Presi-
dent Frank Del Gandio, the Council ex-
ecutives gave their reports.
President Frank Del Gandio asked for
and received Council approval to refi-
nance the mortgage on the ISASI office
condo to lower the mortgage interest
rate and monthly payment. He further
reported on the salary increase of the
ISASI office manager to account for in-
flation and the increase in the cost of liv-
ing in the Washington, D.C., area.
Vice-President Ron Schleede in-
formed the Council that his attention in
the upcoming months would be focused
on his role of working with the various
ISASI working groups and committees.
Treasurer Tom McCarthy gave an
overview of his written report provided
to the Council. He noted completion of
the 2002 audit and tax return, which
showed a year-end net assets/fund bal-
ance of $42,365 for that year. In a 2002
profit-and-loss budget comparison, his
written report noted that ISASI did not
receive any funds from ISASI 2002, held
in Taiwan, due to a misunderstanding
of the hosting group’s financial obliga-
tions to ISASI. The result was a total loss
of $16,000 in budgeted and actual costs
for the 2002 budget year. The Council
discussed the situation that resulted in
seminar profits inadvertently being as-
signed to the Taiwan government and
directed continued discussion to attempt
to achieve an equitable distribution of
the seminar proceeds. Nevertheless, the
Treasurer reported ISASI to be in sound
financial shape. The proposed 2004 bud-
get of $168,850 is within $140 of being
balanced. Following a detailed briefing
of the budget’s income and expense ra-
tios, the Council unanimously approved
it. McCarthy also reported the awarding
of the first two ISASI Memorial Rudy
Kapustin Scholarship Fund scholarships.
Secretary Keith Hagy reported that
his efforts since the May Council meet-
ing were focused on working with the
ISASI web master to develop an ISASI
web communications plan. He and
Corey Stephens provided an overview of
the plan developed with assistance from
Ron Schleede and Kevin Darcy. The
Council recognized the necessity of de-
veloping a web communications plan
considering the growth of the ISASI
website and the demands placed on the
ISASI web master. After some discussion,
the Council approved the web commu-
nications plan and asked that it be in-
cluded in the ISASI Policy Manual. The
Council also approved the establishment
of a Web Committee to be chaired by
Corey Stephens. Other members of the
Committee include Keith Hagy, Ron
Schleede, Curt Lewis, Kevin Darcy, Jim
Stewart, and Marty Martinez. He also
reported the start of an inventory to the
contents of the ISASI library in prepa-
ration for packing and shipping the
material to the ERAU Prescott Campus.
Executive Advisor Dick Stone an-
nounced the selectees for the scholarship
awarded by the ISASI Rudy Kapustin
Memorial Fund as Noelle Brundelle,
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University,
and Michiel Schuurman, Delft University
of Technology, the Netherlands. He also
reported the addition of the University
of New South Whales to the listing of fa-
cilities from which student scholarship
applications will be accepted.
Councillors/National Societies
Australian Councillor Lindsay Naylor
was unable to attend due to health rea-
sons but submitted a written report in
which he noted a very successful Austral-
asian regional air safety seminar in May/
June 2003. He further reported on the
ongoing work being done relative to
hosting ISASI 2004. Larry Doherty
served as Naylor’s proxy and presented
details regarding ISASI 2004 to be held
in Gold Coast Australia August 30
through September 2.
Canadian Councillor Barbara Dunn
reported that CSASI was in sound finan-
cial condition and that her involvement
with the Southern California Safety In-
stitute was producing new members for
CSASI and ISASI. A number of Council
members mentioned that in their in-
volvement with other organizations they
also took the opportunity to provide an
ISASI overview and that those discus-
sions routinely resulted in signing up new
members. All Council members were
asked to take the opportunity to high-
light ISASI in any of the venues of op-
portunity and to use various ISASI pub-
lications to increase ISASI visibility in the
aviation community. Councillor Dunn
further reported that the CSASI Vice-
President had accepted a 6-month as-
signment for ICAO in Nepal. CSASI
continues to get requests for and is pro-
viding bloodborne pathogen training
tapes. In addition, the Society is in the
final development stages of its website.
New Zealand Councillor Ron Chippin-
dale thanked Air New Zealand, which was
assisting with transportation to the meet-
ing and annual seminar. He reported
• NZSASI membership was steady at 47
and that the annual dues rate would re-
main at NZ$100.
• There would be no Australasian semi-
nar this year since it was scheduled for
2004, which clashed with the ISASI 2004
seminar in the same region of the world.
• NZSASI would be sponsoring member
CouncilSets 2004Budget
Caj Frostell, right, makes his report as
Max Saint Germain listens.
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attendance at the 2004 ISASI seminar,
• He and NZSASI had been active with
the MOT in a review of the accident in-
vestigation process in New Zealand.
• He had been successful in recruiting
new student members during his lectures
to Massey University.
• NZSASI was conducting its annual
“aviation safety” essay contest.
voting of the 12-member Awards Com-
mittee for the selection of the person to
receive the Jerome F. Lederer award.
Membership—Tom McCarthy reported
that the current ISASI membership sta-
tus stood at 1,385 individual members
of which 131 were delinquent in dues.
There are 110 corporate members of
which 9 were delinquent in dues. He and
President Del Gandio reminded all
Council members to review the list of
delinquent members and asked that they
contact the delinquent members person-
ally and seek renewal of membership.
Seminar—Kevin Darcy reported that the
hotel envisioned for the possible 2006
seminar bid in San Juan had withdrawn
its room rate guarantee. The Council dis-
cussed possible venues for the 2006 semi-
nar and asked Darcy to contact the hotel
to see if it would honor the previous rate.
If so, the Council would consider San
Juan if a formal bid was made along with
those additional venues.
Based on discussion regarding semi-
nar procedures and the role of the Semi-
nar Committee in managing future
ISASI seminars, the Council determined
that all future seminars would be hosted
and managed by the local ISASI chap-
ter, ISASI society, or the ISASI Seminar
Committee. In the cases of seminars
managed by local chapters or societies,
it is expected that the ISASI Seminar
Committee will take on a more active role
of providing oversight to ensure that
ISASI seminar policies and guidelines
are followed. In seminar locations where
no local chapter or society exists then
the Seminar Committee will manage the
seminar. It was also decided that the
ISASI headquarters office would collect
seminar sponsorship donations.
Reachout—Jim Stewart in a written re-
port said he had received a request for a
Reachout from West Africa that would
consist of 2 days of safety management
system training and 2 days of accident
investigation training. Other locations
discussed for 2004 included Mexico,
China, South Africa, Jamaica, and Costa
Rica. Frank Del Gandio took the oppor-
tunity to acknowledge Jim Stewart and
Caj Frostell for all of their hard work ad-
vancing Reachout.
Working groups
Positions—Ken Smart was unable to at-
tend the Council meeting but had sub-
mitted two new “Positions” for Council
consideration. The subject of the first was
“unlawful interference” and the second
was with regard to “family assistance”
following an accident. After some dis-
cussion, the Council approved the Posi-
tions as drafted by Smart. (The positions
are reprinted below from the July-September
2003 issue of the Forum, page 24.—Editor)
Unlawful Interference
Unlawful interference is defined as any
unlawful act that has been or may have
been committed during the operation
of an aircraft. When it is suspected that
unlawful interference has taken place,
then the police and judicial authorities
should be notified. Any aviation safety
issues should continue to be investigated
and through the normal processes while
maintaining liaison with the police and
judicial authorities.
Family Assistance
The accident investigating authority
should make every effort to ensure that
survivors and bereaved families are kept
informed of the progress of investiga-
tions from the earliest stage to a level
appropriate to the circumstances of the
investigation and in accordance with
their wishes. The basic principle should
be to treat survivors with respect and sen-
sitivity and in a way that we would all
wish to be treated if we were subjected to
the same tragic circumstances. Where
possible the IIC and members of the in-
vestigation team should be directly in-
volved in this process.
New business
Barbara Dunn presented the most recent
version of the ISASI International Semi-
nar Policy and Procedures Manual. A year
in the drafting, Council members had
earlier provided input, which had been
incorporated into the discussed version.
The Council approved the manual as
revised and to include the discussion at
this Council meeting regarding the in-
creased role of the ISASI Seminar Com-
mittee in future ISASI seminars.
Richard Stone, in addressing the semi-
nar financial responsibilities, proposed
an expense form as a way to track and
approve Council member expenses at
future Council meetings. The Council
agreed with the form’s content and ap-
proved its use. u
He further reported that NZSASI pur-
chased a tourism video on New Zealand
at the request of ASASI to advise ISASI
seminar attendees of the opportunity to
stop and spend time in New Zealand if
they attended the 2004 ISASI seminar
in Australia.
United States Councillor Curt Lewis
reported that he had published the
ISASI 2004 seminar notice and agenda
in his flight safety update e-mail notice,
as well as the ISASI individual and cor-
porate membership applications. The
U.S. Society newsletter was published in
July 2003. Since the last Council meet-
ing, two new corporate members joined
the U.S. Society.
International Councillor Caj Frostell
spoke to the importance of Reachout to
ISASI relative to spreading the “safety”
word and increasing ISASI’s visibility in
the international aviation community. He,
too, is distributing ISASI Forum and ISASI
membership applications at SCSI meet-
ings and at the Singapore Aviation Acad-
emy. Frostell also stated that he had been
working IFALPA accreditation of the SCSI
Prague course and the Singapore Avia-
tion Academy course. He has received
confirmation from Singapore that such
accreditation was recently obtained.
Committee reports
Awards—Gale Braden provided a writ-
ten report with regard to details of the
International Council members in
session.
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ISASI ROUNDUP
ISASI 2004 Registration Opens
The Australian Society of Air Safety
Investigators has declared registration
for ISASI 2004 as open. The 35th
annual seminar, which the Society is
sponsoring, will take place Aug. 30-
Sept. 2, 2004, and carry the theme
“Investigate, Communicate, Educate.”
It will be held in the ANA Hotel Gold
Coast, Queensland, Australia.
Registration for the seminar,
tutorial, and hotel may be completed
months, the costs in your equivalent
local currency value will increase.
Hence, unless you are a gambler, the
odds say you should register early.”
Seminar registration costs in Austra-
lian dollars are
Full seminar and related functions
By July 10 After July 10
Member $625 $700
Student Member $500 $550
Non-member $750 $800
Single-day attendance
Student members $100 $100
All Others $250 $250
Tutorials
Interviewing $85 $100
Communicating $85 $100
Companion program $350 $400
Post-seminar function $100 $125
[As of Jan. 13, 2004, the exchange rate in U.S.
dollars was 1 Australian dollar = US77cents.
Exchange rates may be found at http//www.expedia.
com/pub/agent.dll.—Editor]
The ANA Hotel Gold Coast is a five-
star property located in the heart of
Queensland’s Gold Coast. It is a very
popular international and domestic tour-
ist holiday area. Thanks to a generous
offer by the hotel, the accommodations
rate for delegates will be A$154 (single/
twin/ double, deluxe ocean view room)
including tax. That represents a very rea-
sonable tariff for a hotel of this standard.
For those who wish to arrive early or re-
main after the seminar, the same rate is
available. Registration forms are available
on the ISASI 2004 website. According to
the hotel, “A block booking of hotel rooms
for seminar delegates is being held only
until June 30, 2004. After that date, avail-
ability of rooms is not guaranteed.” The
hotel may be contacted at P.O. Box 93,
Surfers Paradise, Qld 4217 Australia; tele-
phone reservations: +61 (0)7 5579 1060;
Fax +61 (0)7 5592 2908.
Technical and social programming for
the seminar is being completed. Tutorial
planning is done and calls for two ses-
sions to be conducted: (1) interviewing
and (2) communicating and educating.
More information on the technical pro-
gram will be published in subsequent is-
sues of this publication. Social activities
include a cocktail reception on Monday
evening, an off-site dinner on Tuesday
evening, and the Awards Banquet on
Thursday evening. The companion pro-
gram will include a full-day tour and a
half-day tour. A Friday activity is also be-
ing planned as a seminar “wind down.”
About Australia
The ISASI website has this to say about
the seminar location: “Those interna-
tional visitors to Australia intending to
participate in the ISASI seminar will
probably enter Australia through
either Sydney or Brisbane Interna-
tional Airports. Those arriving in
Brisbane will be able to use a Gold
Coast shuttle bus that departs from the
airport at regular intervals, and will
drop guests at Gold Coast hotels
(including the ANA Gold Coast). Cost
of return shuttle per person is likely to
be around A$35. An airport rail and
bus option is also available.
“For travelers arriving in Sydney (or
one of the other Australian interna-
tional airports), you can either drive up
the coast (and allow 1-2 days from
Sydney for this) or take one of the
domestic flights to Coolangatta Airport
(Gold Coast). From there, a shuttle or
taxi will take you to the hotel.
“Local weather: September/October/
November-Spring, mean temperature:
20.6° C (70° F), max. temperature:
25.3° C (78° F), min. temperature:
16.0° C (61° F); precipitation: averages
50 mm (2”) a month—rains once every
3-4 weeks. For current Gold Coast
weather information, visit the Austra-
lian Bureau of Meteorology.
“Brief facts: Australia is a very large
continent, with a climate and geography
that varies from snow-capped mountains
to tropical rainforests to arid deserts.
International visitors are reminded that
if driving inland, there can be large
distances between towns (fuel, food,
water, etc.). If driving, drive on the left
side of the road and adhere to local
speed limits, which vary between states
through the ISASI 2004 seminar
website at www.asasi.org/isasi2004.htm.
Registration can be done on line or by
fax or mail. Alternatively, the registra-
tion from printed adjacent to this
article may be completed and mailed
to the indicated address. Registration
costs will include breakfasts and social
functions and (for companions) the
day tours. Tutorial registrations and an
optional Friday “wind down” tour will
be optional extras.
Lindsay Naylor, seminar Chairman,
said: “When considering if there is a
‘best time’ to register for ISASI 2004,
remember that registrations will be in
Australian dollars only. The Australian
dollar has risen in value against most
major foreign currencies by around 35
percent in the past 12 months, and
economists are predicting further rises
through 2004, even though the dollar
is currently at a ‘6-year high.’ If these
rises should continue in coming
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August 30–September 2 • A professional training seminar presented by ISASI
Name: _________________________________________ ISASI No. ______________________________________
Organization: ______________________________________________________________________________________
Address: ___________________________________________________________________________________________
Tel. (Hm): ____________________ Tel. (Bus): _______________________ Tel. (Cell) _____________________
E-mail Address: _____________________________________________________________________________________
Name & title on badge: ______________________________________________________________________________
Companion’s name on badge: _________________________________________________________________________
Please check appropriate box (Please note, all fees are shown in Australian dollars):
Registration by July 10 Registration after July 10
Full Seminar & Function
Member q $625 q $700
ISASI Student Member q $500 q $550
Non-member q $750 q $800
Single Day
Tuesday q $250   q Student $100 q $250   q Student $100
Wednesday q $250   q Student $100 q $250   q Student $100
Thursday q $250   q Student $100 q $250   q Student $100
Tutorials
Interviewing q $85 q $100
Communicating and Educating q $85 q $100
Companion Program q $350 q $400
Post-Seminar Function q $100 q $125
Subtotal: ________________________________ _____________________________
Total Amount Due: ________________________________ _____________________________
Special Meal Requests (Vegetarian, Halal, Vegan, Kosher, etc.): _____________________________________________
Credit Card Type (Visa, MasterCard, Bankcard): _________________________________________________________
Credit Card Number: ______________________________________________ Expiration Date: _______________
If paying by credit card, fax to: Lindsay Naylor +61 2 6255 4413 or Paul Mayes +64 9 256 3911
If paying by money mrder or check, please send to: ASASI, P.O. BOX 588, Civic Square, ACT 2608 Australia
For assistance, contact: Lindsay Naylor +61 2 6241 2514   E-mail: lnaylor@spitfire.com.au
Cancellations made before July 10, 2004, will incur a $10 processing fee.
Cancellations made between July 11–August 10, 2004, will incur a $75 administration fee.
There will be no refunds for cancellations after August 10, 2004.
INVESTIGATE, COMMUNICATE,EDUCATE—2004
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and are enforced by local police. The
wearing of seatbelts is mandatory for all
vehicle occupants in all states. The
maximum blood alcohol limit while
driving, in all states, is 0.05 percent.
“The electrical supply in Australia is
240 volts AC at 50 Hz. A two- or three-
pin plug is used. Most large hotels
provide 220/110 volt outlets for
shavers/dryers, etc., and data comm
ports. Australia uses the metric system,
thus all speeds, distances, and tem-
peratures are given in metric units.
Australia uses three time zones (EST,
CST, and WST). Some states also move
to daylight saving. However, Queens-
land does not and remains on EST
(UTC +10 hours). See the Time and
Date page for the current Queensland
date and time. “If bringing a mobile
(cell) phone, it will need to be able to
access the 900/1,800 Mhz GSM system
or the 800 Mhz CDMA system and
have roaming rights between your own
phone company and one of the
Australian phone companies.
“The Australian currency is the
Australian dollar. See the forex calcula-
tor for exchange rates. Foreign cur-
rency will generally not be accepted in
shops, restaurants, etc. However,
nearly all shops, restaurants, etc.,
accept popular credit cards.” If anyone
has any queries on any aspect of the
seminar, please contact Lindsay Naylor
at lnaylor@spitfire.com.au. u
Election Nominations
Due April 1
The ISASI Nomination Committee has
issued a Call for Nominations for the
Executive Officer and Councillor
positions that will be open to election
for the years 2005-2006. The nomina-
tion deadline is April 1, 2004. The
positions to be filled are president, vice-
president, secretary, treasurer, U.S.
councillor, and international councillor.
Each potential candidate whose
name is submitted to the Nominating
Committee must have consented to the
submission. The nominator must
submit a short biographical sketch of
the nominee. Nominees must be at
least a full member to be eligible for
office within ISASI. Nominations
should be sent to the ISASI office,
attention Nominating Committee. u
Awards Committee Seeks
Lederer Nominations
The ISASI Awards Committee is
seeking nominations for the 2004
Jerome F. Lederer Award. For consid-
eration this year, nominations must be
received by the end of May, according
to Committee Chairman Gale Braden
The purpose of the Jerome F.
Lederer Award is to recognize out-
standing contributions to technical
excellence in accident investigation.
“The Award is presented each year
during our annual seminar to a
recipient who is recognized for positive
advancements in the art and science of
air safety investigation,” said Braden
The nomination process allows any
member of ISASI to submit a nomina-
tion. The nominee may be an indi-
vidual, a group of individuals, or an
organization. The nominee is not
required to be an ISASI member. The
nomination may be for a single event,
a series of events, or a lifetime of
achievement. The nomination letter
for the Lederer Award should be
limited to a single page.
The ISASI Awards Committee,
made up of 12 ISASI members,
considers such traits as duration and
persistence, standing among peers,
manner and techniques of operating,
and achievements. Once nominated, a
nominee is considered for the next 3
years and then dropped. After an
intervening year, the candidate may be
nominated for another 3-year period.
“The Lederer Award is one of the
most significant honors an accident
investigator can receive; therefore,
considerable care is given in determin-
ing the recipient. Each ISASI member
should thoughtfully review his or her
association with professional investiga-
tors and submit a nomination when
they identify someone who has been
outstanding in increasing the technical
quality of accident investigation,”
noted Braden.
Nominations should be mailed or
e-mailed to the ISASI office, 107 Holly
Ave., Suite 11, Sterling, VA 20164-
5405 USA; e-mail address: isasi@erols.
com; or directly to the Awards Com-
mittee Chairman, Gale Braden, 2413
Brixton Road, Edmond, OK 73034
USA; e-mail geb@ilinkusa.net u
Kapustin Scholarship
Issues Application Call
The ISASI Rudolf Kapustin Memorial
Fund has issued its call for scholarship
applications to universities and
colleges whose students are eligible to
participate in the program, according
to the Fund’s administrators, Richard
Stone, ISASI Executive Advisor, and
Ron Schleede, ISASI Vice-President.
The deadline for applications is April
1, 2004.
The goal of the Fund is to encour-
age and assist college-level students
interested in the field of aviation safety
and aircraft occurrence investigation.
All members of ISASI enrolled as a
full-time student in an ISASI-recog-
nized education program concentrated
on aviation safety and/or aircraft
occurrence investigation are eligible
for the scholarship. A student who has
once received the annual ISASI Rudolf
Kapustin Memorial will not be eligible
to apply for it again. One or more
students will be selected in this process
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to attend the ISASI annual seminar.
This year the seminar will be held at
the ANA Hotel Gold Coast in
Queensland, Australia, on August 30-
September 2.
Continued funding for the Memo-
rial Fund is through donations, which
in the United States are tax deductible.
An award of $1,500 is made to each
student who wins the competitive
writing requirement, meets the
application requirements, and who
registers to attend the ISASI annual
seminar. The award will be used to
cover costs for the seminar registration
fees, travel, and lodging/meals ex-
penses. Any expenses above and
beyond the amount of the award will
be borne by the recipient. Last year,
two awards were presented. They went
to Noelle Brundelle, Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, and Michiel
Schuurman, Delft University of
Technology, the Netherlands.
The Fund is administered by an
appointed committee and oversight of
expenditures is done by the ISASI
Treasurer. The Committee ensures that
the education program is at an ISASI-
recognized school and applicable to the
aims of the Society, assesses the applica-
tions, and determines the most suitable
candidate(s). Donors and recipients will
be advised if donations are made in
honor of a particular individual.
Application requirements
• A full-time student in an aviation
safety/investigation/system safety course
of minimum duration of 1 year. The
student must be a member of ISASI.
• The student is to submit a 1,000 (+/-
10 percent) word paper in English
addressing “The Challenges For Air
Safety Investigators.”
• The paper is to be the student’s own
work and must be countersigned by
the student’s tutor/academic supervisor
as authentic, original work.
• The papers will be judged on their
content, original thinking, logic, and
clarity of expression.
• The student must complete the
application available at the university
or at ISASI headquarters and submit it
to ISASI with their paper by April 1,
2004.
• Completed applications should be
forwarded to ISASI, 107 Holly Ave.,
Suite 11, Sterling, VA 20164-5405
USA. E-mail address: isasi@erols.com;
Telephone: 703-430-9668.
• Applicants will be notified of ISASI’s
decision about the award by May 1,
2004.
• The judges’ decision is final.
Universities and colleges whose
students are eligible to participate in
this scholarship program are
Auburn University, USA
Bridgewater College, USA
Central Missouri University, USA
Concordia University, Montreal,
Canada
Dowling College, USA
Embry-Riddle University, Daytona
Beach, USA
Embry-Riddle University, Prescott, USA
Florida Institute of Technology, USA
Hankuk Aviation University, Korea
Inter American University, Puerto Rico
Kent State, USA
Massey University, Auckland, NZ
Ohio University, USA
Parks College, USA
Pontificia University, Brazil
Purdue University, USA
San Jose State, USA
Southern Illinois University, USA
Western Michigan University, USA
University of New South Wales,
Queensland, Australia u
Reachout Resumes
Workshop Schedule
Following a 6-month breathing space,
the ISASI Reachout program has
begun its second round of workshops.
The next workshop was scheduled for
Mexico City January 26-30 and
included a workshop on accident
investigation and safety management.
Hosts for the workshop were the
Mexican Air Line Pilots Association
(ASPA), and ISASI was again sup-
ported by ICAO. The Air Line Pilots
Association and Continental Airlines
were corporate sponsors, and ASPA
also provided considerable sponsor-
ship. The 5-day workshop included
four ISASI instructors—Caj Frostell
and Ron Schleede for accident investi-
gation and Jim Stewart and Dick Stone
for safety management.
NEW MEMBERS
Busby, E., MO4987, Ocean View, DE, USA
Chappell, AO4978, Hendra,
Queensland Australia
Dawson, F., MO4988, Lantau
Dee, E., AO4974, Lumby, B.C.
Foster, W., MO4972, Caledon East,
ON, Canada
Fournier, W., AO4990, Monterey, CA, USA
French, R., AO4992, Langley, B.C.
Harris, M., ST4983, Daytona Beach,
FL, USA
Hayes, L., MO4981, Camarillo, CA, USA
Hutsell, G., MO4973, Madison, AL, USA
Kovoor, ST4971, Auckland, New Zealand
Ledoux, MO4989, Saint Hippolyte,
 Quebec, Canada
Matthews, ST4984, APO, AE 09601
McNair, J., MO4986, Orleans, Ottawa,
ON, Canada
Montgomery, O., MO4993, Bowie,
MD, USA
Parham, S., FO4980, Vero Beach, FL,
USA
Parker, B., AO4976, Costa Mesa, CA, USA
Peters, E., MO4979, Potomac, MD,
USA
Pouliezos, S., MO4994, Hilioupolis,
 Greece
Smith, H., MO4991, Mont Tremblant,
Quebec, Canada
Swanson, T., MO4995, Amherst, NH,
USA
Tank, MO4982, Prescott, AZ, USA
van Gelder, N., MO4985,
Oud-Turnhout, Belgiu
Villegas, II, M., MO4977, North Las
Vegas, NV, USA
West, E., MO4970, McLean, VA, USA
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Plans are under way for a mid-May
Reachout to be held in Beijing. The
workshop will be hosted by the ICAO
Cooperative Development of Opera-
tional Safety and Continuing Airwor-
thiness Program (COS-CAP) and will
follow the very successful program that
COS-CAP hosted in India and Sri
Lanka last year. The India and Sri
Lanka workshops were considered one
of the highest quality workshops to be
delivered in the area. The organizers
and Jim Stewart, Chairman of ISASI
Reachout, credited the instructors, Caj
Frostell, Elaine Parker, and Keith
McGuire, for that success and for the
return invitation. “Taking ISASI
Reachout to Beijing has been high on
our priority list since the Reachout
program was formed,” said Stewart.
“The support and visibility we are
receiving through ICAO has opened
the door on a number of possible
Reachout sites.”
Barbara Dunn, Canadian Councillor
and Society President, has been asked
to head up a second Reachout pro-
gram in India, following an invitation
by the ICAO COS-CAP program. “The
hosts asked for a cabin safety work-
shop,” Stewart reported, “as well as a
maintenance workshop.” The
Reachout Chairman is still looking for
someone to participate in a mainte-
nance workshop, and asks anyone with
a maintenance background and
experience instructing to please come
forward and contact him.
“We have a tentative workshop
scheduled for Cairo, Egypt, in the near
future,” said Stewart, “but the dates are
yet to be confirmed.” The workshop
scheduled to be held in Burkina Faso
was to have been the first non-English
Reachout; it has been delayed and will
be rescheduled.
The ISASI International Council
believes the program has successfully
reached its target audience. The
program has expanded its subject
matter to deal with accident investiga-
tion, safety management, ATS safety
management, and, with the recent
request for a cabin safety workshop, is
in the process of adding a fourth area.
Reachout’s working group members
are actively seeking additional hosts.
Tom McCarthy, ISASI Treasurer, acts
as the gatekeeper for sponsorship
funding and both he and the Reachout
Chairman have to agree before commit-
ments are made to support a particular
workshop with sponsorship funds.
“Right after the Mexico City work-
shop,” McCarthy said, “Jim Stewart and
I will be planning a major fundraising
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA
• Aviation Safety Program Management
Mar. 22-Apr. 2, Jun. 21-Jul. 2, Sept. 20, Oct.
1, Dec. 6-17
• Human Factors in Aviation Safety
Mar. 1-5, May 17-21, Sept. 13-17, Nov. 8-12
• Safety Management for
Aviation Maintenance
May 10-14, Nov. 1-5
• Software Safety
Apr. 26-29, Nov. 15-18
• Gas Turbine Accident Investigation
May 3-7, Nov. 15-19
• Accident/Incident Response Preparedness
Feb. 23-35, Oct. 18-20
• Photography in Accident Investigations
Feb. 26-27, Oct. 21-22
• Helicopter Accident Investigation
Apr. 5-9, Oct. 25-29
• Aircraft Accident Investigation
Mar. 8-19, Jun. 7-18, Oct. 4-15
• Incident Investigation/Analysis
Aug. 30-Sept. 2
For further information contact:
University of Southern California/Aviation
Safety Programs
Tele: 310-342-1345
Website: www.usc.edu/dept/engineering/
AV.html
TRAINING COURSE CALENDAR 2004
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
SAFETY INSTITUTE
A=Albuquerque, NM
T=Torrance, CA
O=Ottawa, Canada
V=Vancouver, British Columbia
PR=Prague, the Czech Republic
• Aircraft Accident Investigation (A)
May 30-Jun. 11, Oct. 11-22
• Human Factors for Accident Investigators (A)
Mar. 8-12, Jun. 14-18, Oct. 25-29
• Investigation Management (A)
Mar. 15-19, Jun. 21-25, Nov. 1-5
• Gas Turbine Accident Investigation (A)
Mar. 22-26, Nov. 8-12
• Aircraft Performance and Structures
Investigation (A)
Nov. 17-21 (03)
• Operational Risk Management (T)
Mar. 1-5
• Ramp and Maintenance Safety (T)
TBD
• Fire and Explosives Investigation (A)
TBD
• Helicopter Accident Investigation (A)
Mar. 29-Apr 2
• Safety Management Systems (T)
Sept. 13-24
• Human Factors in Safety
Management Systems (T)
Sept. 27-Oct. 1
• European Edition of the Cabin
Safety Symposium (PR)
Mar. 23-25
• Basic Accident Prevention and
Investigation (PR)
Apr. 19-30
For further information contact:
Eduardo Treto, Registrar
SCSI, 3521 Lomita Blvd, Ste 103
Torrance, CA 90505-5016, USA
Tele: 1-800-545-3766 or 310-517-8844,
Fax: 310-540-0532
E-mail: registrar@scsi-inccom
Website: wwwscsi-inccom
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
INSTITUTE & FAA
• Aircraft Accident Investigation
Mar. 9-17, May 3-11, Jun. 8-16, Jul. 13-21,
Jul. 27-Aug. 4, Aug. 18-26,
• Accident Investigation Recurrent Tng.
Mar. 2-4, Apr. 20-22, Aug. 10-12, Sept. 14-16
• Human Factors in Accident Investigation
Feb. 10-12, Apr. 13-15, Jun. 29-Jul. 1, Aug.
31-Sept. 2
• Rotorcraft Accident Investigation
Feb. 18-27, Mar. 23-Apr 1, Apr. 20-29, May
18-27
• Aircraft Cabin Safety Investigation
May 4-5, Aug. 19-20
• Aviation Safety Officer
May 18-20
• Amateur Build Aircraft Accident
Investigation
Jun. 8-10, Jul. 27-29
• Turbine Engine Accident Investigation
May 18-20
For further information contact:
Pat Brown, Transport Safety Institute
Tele: 405-954-7206
Website: www.tsi.dot.gov
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campaign to rebuild the Reachout
account and allow us to continue with
this important ISASI program.” ISASI
Reachout’s continued success and its
ability to offer a no-cost workshop
experience to participants is dependent
on ISASI’s corporate sponsors.
If you are interested in joining the
Reachout team as a corporate sponsor,
please contact Jim Stewart, Chairman of
ISASI Reachout, at stewartj@alpa.org or
through the ISASI home office. u
PNRC Receives Session on
Interviewing Techniques
At the November 2003 technical
meeting, the Pacific Northwest Re-
gional Chapter received a presentation
by Dick Wood on the principles of
interviewing witnesses. The meeting
was well attended by both members
and guests. Wood has worked exten-
sively with witness interviews while in
the Air Force, as an instructor at USC,
and as a consultant. He presented
several interesting aspects critical to
interviewing that will improve the
quality of an investigation. He encour-
aged the group to separate witnesses
into those who are reporting what they
did from those who are reporting what
they saw. He also illustrated the
importance of using model aircraft in
the interview process and how to go
from general questions to specific
questions without the use of leading
questions. The meeting was held at the
Boeing Longacres facility in Renton.
The PNRC will be continuing its
technical meetings on alternate
months throughout 2004. Meetings
are currently scheduled for March 10,
May 12, July 14, September 8, and
November 10. Guests from other
regions or individuals interested in
aviation safety are always invited to
attend any of the Chapter meetings.
Details on the exact times and loca-
tions for these presentations can be
obtained directly from Chapter
President Kevin Darcy at kdarcy@
safeserv.com or from Leo Rydzewski at
leo.j.rydzewski@boeing.com. u
MARC Recounts
Seminar Success
The Mid-Atlantic Regional Chapter
President Ron Schleede exclaimed the
Chapter’s delight with the success of
ISASI 2003 held in Washington, D.C.,
in August. He said, “To all who missed
ISASI 2003, you missed a great semi-
nar! MARC and our Committee thank
all who attended and helped. I am sure
the support for ISASI 2004 will be tre-
mendous and it will be a great show! My
wife, Kathie, and I plan to be there.”
Because of the success of ISASI
2003, and primarily because of the
tremendous support of corporate
members, ISASI and MARC will
benefit financially, enabling the Society
to continue its work that could not be
accomplished without such support.
Schleede said, “We hope to use part of
the funds to make MARC more active
and useful to our members, and to
support the ISASI Rudolf Kapustin
Memorial Fund. Rudy kept MARC
running for many years and he would
be pleased to know his work is continu-
ing through the funding of scholar-
ships for new investigators.”
MARC plans to hold its annual
dinner/meeting on Thursday, May 6,
2004, which will be held in conjunction
with the ISASI International Council
meeting. The venue for that event is
not yet established. u
ATSWG Assesses Group
Performance
The year 2003 has disappeared from
our radar screen almost as quickly as it
arrived. Like any useful endeavor, our
working group performance can be
measured by the simple question, Did
we make a difference? We think we can
say “yes.”
Our objective was to aim at our “top
ten” ATS safety issues in 2003. This
objective proved a little too ambitious,
but we managed to meet some of them
in part.
The issues of TCAS/ACAS interface
were broadly highlighted by Secretary
Bert Ruitenberg in a number of high-
profile forums. The lessons learned
from the tragedy at Überlingen have
been largely disseminated at the
operational and management levels of
many ATM service providers. Aspects
of human performance, systems
integration, and privatization were
combined to add a new dimension to
ATS investigations.
Equally, our group managed to
tread the boards of the world stage
thanks to the efforts of past ATS WG
Chairman Darren Gaines. Gaines
represented ISASI at ICAO Regional
Safety Seminars on runway safety and
safety management in Singapore and
Cairo. In conjunction with representa-
tives from ICAO, IFATCA, FAA,
Eurocontrol, Airservices Australia, UK
CAA, and Nav Canada, Gaines was
able to present a working level view of
the issues and offer strategies to
militate against the problems. This
level of representation is indicative of
the collective status enjoyed by the
ATSWG. We believe that it will con-
tinue to develop and become an even
greater safety tool for our industry. u
Lewis Elected to
BCSP V.P. Position
C.L. (Curt) Lewis, ISASI U.S. Council-
lor and President of the U.S. Society,
was recently elected to fill the 2004
Vice-President position of the Board of
Certified Safety Professionals. The term
of office is 1 year. Henry Smahlik,
BCSP’s current Vice-President, was
elected to fill the President position.
Lewis is currently Manager of System
Safety for American Airlines in Fort
Worth, Tex., as well as President of the
ISASI Ft. Worth Chapter. He also fills a
Director-At-Large position on the BCSP
Board and has served since 1999. u
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AirTran Airways’ First ‘Guiding Principle’
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(Who’s Who is a brief profile on an ISASI
corporate member to enable a more thor-
ough understanding of the organization’s
role and functions.—Editor)At AirTran Airways, safety is notonly a word, but also a culturethat is instilled in each crew-
member from his or her first day of
working at the airline. During the
orientation process, crewmembers
learn to incorporate safety into
everything they do, whether they are
out on the tarmac or in the terminal
assisting a customer.
After the events of Sept. 11, 2001,
AirTran Airways proved itself as a
leader in the industry by being the first
airline to complete the installation of
cockpit door reinforcements 1 month
before the deadlines set by the Federal
Aviation Administration.
Furthermore, on Jan. 9, 2002,
AirTran Airways responded quickly to
crewmember’s demands for enforced
cabin safety by being the first U.S.
airline to offer Close Quarter Defense
(CQD) training for the carrier’s flight
attendants. The free and voluntary
classes taught self-defense techniques
specifically geared toward linear
defense in the cabin and aisle and
received an overwhelming response
from flight attendants, as well as
interest from other airlines who soon
followed in the airline’s footsteps.
Pilots also have benefited from
AirTran Airways’ participation in
voluntary safety programs, including
Flight Operational Quality Assurance
(FOQA) and AirTran’s Safety Collabo-
rative Program (ASCP), a customized
version of the FAA’s Aviation Safety
Action Program (ASAP). During initial,
upgrade, and recurrent training, pilots
are taught the benefits of ASCP, a
program that promotes a non-jeop-
ardy environment where concerns can
be expressed without fear of reprisal
provided certain conditions are met.
Although AirTran Airways works
hard to prevent incidents from occur-
ring in the first place, investments in
safety software technology, such as
AQD (Aviation Quality Database) and
TRAX, have proven to be boons in
tracking and preventing potential
incidents and events.
AQD is a safety database that tracks
safety and reliability of services by
monitoring and studying inventory or
mechanical issues before they can
escalate into larger problems that
could affect operations.
“AirTran Airways is a strong propo-
nent of using technological advances to
enhance the reliability, safety, mainte-
nance, operations, and security issues
that constantly challenge our industry,”
said J.P. Dagon, AirTran Airways’
Director of Corporate Safety. Dagon
heads up the Safety Department that
oversees operational and occupational
safety issues and includes an indepen-
dent internal evaluation program.
Safety in the workplace also is an
important focus for the airline. Last
year, AirTran Airways joined the OSHA
Airline Alliance to create standards and
procedures to improve occupational
safety at airlines and airports.
The past few years marked many
enhancements in AirTran Airways’
focus on safety for its customers, but
none more so than this past October,
when the airline’s last McDonnell
Douglas DC-9 aircraft were retired and
replaced by Boeing 717s.
“AirTran Airways is 100 percent com-
mitted to the safety and security of our
crewmembers and passengers, and the
corporate initiatives we have adopted in
the past few years are proof of our
dedication,” said Dagon. u
incidents, events, and findings and
produces an analysis report for the
airline’s internal evaluation program.
TRAX was implemented systemwide as
a tool for maintenance and engineering
to track such things as fleet reliability,
quality assurance and control, mainte-
nance discrepancies, aircraft perfor-
mance and modifications, and vendor
performance and inventory.
In addition, AirTran Airways became
one of the first in the industry to use
an interactive safety software program
meant to assist it in determining the
underlying cause of operational issues,
particularly in the Reliability, Quality
Assurance, and Safety Departments.
The Reason 6.0?  Root Cause Analysis
and Lessons Learned System by
Decision Systems, Inc., maximizes the
